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Abstract 
This thesis laid the emphasis on Zhejiang Province which SMEs play a dominant role 
and is characterized with informal finance. The current financial system provided 
little opportunity for the SMEs to raise fund; companies in temporary illiquidity or 
facing solvency crisis obviously could not possibly rely upon internal capital for 
financing. Then, informal finance should be deeply studied. Guiding the informal 
finance to alleviate the SMEs financing difficulties could make contribution the 
financial and social stability at large. Therefore, it is a meaningful topic to be studied, 
both in theoretical and practical perspective.  
 
In chapter 2, the focus is mainly laid on studying the status quo of the SME financing 
in Zhejiang Province and exploring the role formal and informal financing play. 
Through literatures consulting, a tailor made questionnaire has been designed to learn 
the basic information, business establishment, business growth and funding sources of 
the firms. The copies of the questionnaire have been disseminated to the sampled 
entrepreneurs of SMEs across Zhejiang Province. Through the data collected from the 
valid copies, we could gain a brief understanding of these firms and its financing 
situation through basic descriptive statistics. With the data collected from the 150 
valid copies, we have gained a brief understanding of these firms and their financing 
situation through basic descriptive statistics.  
 
In chapter 3, we tend to adopt various empirical methods to analyze the relationship 
of usage of formal (informal) lending and other factors. Correlation analysis, binary 
regression model and ordered logistic regression model is applied on the collected 
questionnaire data. With this empirical investigation, we try to further explore what 
impact these reputation and relationship variables may have on the financing practices 
they try to employ. 
 
From the empirical results, we find that firms with strong political ties, higher 
education, larger turnover and having received credit rating are more likely to employ 
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formal financing practices. No consistent results have been found for informal 
financing practices. Moreover, we find that more factors work in the case of global 
financial crisis while only political ties and credit rating status work in the tightened 
monetary background like the period after year 2010. Combining these results, we 
conclude that reputation and relationship are vital in obtaining funds from formal 
financing channels in China. By contrast, all kinds of SMEs’ entrepreneurs are likely 
to tap the informal financing market. The finding is critical: on the one hand, the 
criteria necessary to obtain formal loans are quite stringent; on the other hand, the 
informal market seems to set no threshold for financing. In the light of these 
considerations, informal financing will inevitably play a dominant role within the 
financial system.   
 
In chapter 4, we firstly consult the extant literatures to learn the SMEs practice around 
the world. We then hold interviews with five managers from a commercial bank to 
learn their mindset towards SMEs business. Then, through the combination of what 
we find from the literature and the interviews, as well as the empirical results from the 
previous chapters, we propose specific policy suggestions. Policy suggestions are 
proposed from three different dimensions: the supply side of funds for SMEs 
financing (including both the formal and informal financial institutions); and the 
demand side. Such grand view will offer more insightful understanding in SMEs 
financing. The policy suggestions proposed are explicit, specific and practical. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Small- and medium-sized enterprises in China and Zhejiang Province 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a vitally important role in 
economic development worldwide. SMEs dominate the number of business 
enterprises in both developed and developing countries. Their importance is not only 
exhibited by their turnover percentage, but also by the strong support they offer to 
economic growth and employment. Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirgüç-Kunt (2003) found 
that the contribution of SMEs to employment has grown increasingly significant with 
increasing income, with a range from 17.5% (contribution ratio) in low-income 
countries to 57.24% in high-income countries. Similarly, their contribution to GDP is 
also impressive and ranges from 15.56% (contribution ratio) in low-income countries 
to 51.45% in high-income countries. 
 
In China, SMEs play a very important role in the national economy. Since the reform 
and opening up policy in 1978, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been busy 
unloading the historical burden by, for example, restructuring and laying off staff. The 
rapid development of the Chinese economy can to a large extent be attributed to the 
rise in the number of SMEs. According to the McKinsey report (Farrell, Lund, 
Rosenfeld, Morin, Gupta, and Greenberg, 2006), private enterprises’ turnover—of 
which a large proportion refers to SMEs—has grown faster than GDP growth. The 
share of production of the wholly SOEs have shrunk to one-quarter of GDP. SMEs 
with rapid, healthy, and sustainable growth help boost the economy, absorb the labor 
force, and promote innovation. According to the data from the Report of the SMEs 
Development in China (2007–2008), SMEs cover 99.8% of the number of enterprises, 
58% of the GDP, 59% of the social sale revenue, 50.2% of the tax revenue, and 63% 
of the export output. They also offer 75% of jobs, greatly alleviating unemployment. 
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In Zhejiang Province, which is characterized by abundant SMEs, the figure is even 
more impressive. According to the Development Report 2015 of SMEs, Zhejiang 
Province (Zhang, 2016), there were 40,243 SMEs in Zhejiang Province in 2014, 
which included 98.54% of all enterprises. SMEs, as a whole, have made vital and 
irreplaceable contributions to the economic aggregate, employment, tax revenue, and 
export earnings. 
 
Economic aggregate  
In 2014, the industrial value that was created by SMEs amounted to 5101.8 billion 
Yuan, which is equivalent to 76.1% of the total industrial value in Zhejiang. As for 
industrial value added, the contribution of SMEs amounts to 923.58 billion Yuan, 
which is equivalent to 73.6% of the total industrial value added in Zhejiang. 
 
Employment 
Rapid development in SMEs has made a vital contribution to job creation in Zhejiang 
Province. SMEs are the main channel for absorbing labor forces. In 2014, there were 
5.92 million people employed within SMEs, and the employment contribution ratio 
was 91.10%. 
 
Tax revenue 
Despite the downward pressure in the economy, SMEs are still a reliable source of tax 
revenue in Zhejiang. In 2014, SMEs in Zhejiang paid 196.0 billion Yuan taxes, which 
is equivalent to 64.98% of the total tax revenue in that year. 
 
Export earnings 
Zhejiang Province is highly developed in foreign trade. SMEs have always been the 
main force pushing high export earnings. In 2014, SMEs recorded 861.9 billion Yuan 
export delivery value, which is equivalent to 72.3% of the total export delivery value. 
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One of the important reasons why SMEs in Zhejiang makes such a great contribution 
is that it has a vibrant market-oriented private economy. As the 2015 China Zhejiang 
Investment Report shows, the vast majority of foreign investors have considerable 
insight into the Chinese economy, and 32% of foreign investors believe that Zhejiang 
is synonymous with China's private economy. 
 
Despite the fact that SMEs play a dominant role in China and Zhejiang Province, they 
still face tough hurdles in survival and further development, of which financing is one 
of the most severe and complicated factors. 
 
1.2. SME financing constraints caused by the malfunction of the financial system 
in China 
By their nature, SMEs are relatively small, lack resources and collateral, operate in an 
opaque manner, and are perceived by lenders to be more risky as they have a more 
volatile pattern of growth, profitability, cash flow, and earnings, which enhances 
default risk and business insolvency compared to larger firms (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Berger and Udell, 1998; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008). This is compounded by 
a lack of credit history and credit rating if the business has not borrowed in the past. A 
limited bank–client relationship makes it difficult for a bank to assess the viability and 
track record of the company’s finances, resulting in a high loan processing time and 
cost for loan approvals. SMEs may also lack the necessary information and skills to 
access external finance, including the compilation of a bankable business plan. 
 
The characteristics of the banking system in developing and emerging markets 
frequently inhibit SME lending (Harvie, Narjoko, and Oum, 2013). Many banks are 
state-owned and they allocate credit on the basis of government guarantees or in line 
with government targeting to specific sectors. Banks are often subject to ceilings on 
the interest rates they can charge, making it difficult to price credit in a way that 
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reflects the risk of lending to SMEs. In other cases, banks may have ownership and 
other ties to industrial interests and tend to favor affiliated companies. In a market 
where banks can earn acceptable returns on other lending, the banks cannot develop 
the skills needed to deal with and lend to SMEs. Furthermore, financial markets in 
developing or emerging markets may not contain the necessary range of products and 
services to meet the needs of SMEs. 
 
Here, we briefly introduce the formal financial market in China. The core identifying 
characteristic of the formal market is that its function relies on the anonymous 
interaction between a client and a formal financial institution (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 
2005). The formal financial system is mainly composed of commercial banks and 
capital markets. 
 
The Chinese financial system is characterized by a dominant banking sector that is 
predominantly state owned (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). As a 
consequence, a large share of bank funding flows into state-controlled companies, 
regardless of their profitability. Moreover, due to the inadequate information on other 
borrowers’ credit histories and financial performance, together with weak credit-rating 
skills and personnel, banks tend to lend to SOEs. The SOEs are a seemingly low-risk 
option because the SOEs’ debts have implicit government backing, which leaves the 
more productive private sector (most of which are SMEs) seriously credit constrained. 
According to Tian (2013), the total amount of loans made to SMEs was 1.08 trillion 
RMB, which is 19.6% of all the loans made in 2011. In spite of recent policy reform 
that encourages commercial banks to provide loans to SMEs, only 62.2% of SMEs 
reported that their funding requests could be met up to 80% of the credit required. 
 
While China’s banking system is large, its equity and bond markets are smaller than 
most of developed countries, both in terms of market capitalization and total value 
traded as a percentage of GDP. The equity markets are, to a large extent, a vehicle for 
privatization by the government rather than a market for capital raising by firms with 
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growth opportunities (Wang, Xu, and Zhu, 2004). Durnev, Kan, Randall, and Bernard 
(2004) show that compared to other transition economies, China has one of the 
poorest functioning stock markets with highly synchronous stock returns, which may 
be linked to weak property rights, corporate opacity, and political rent-seeking. The 
corporate bond market in China is crippled by excessive government regulation 
(Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). The approval and issuance 
process is so cumbersome that it takes 14–17 months to issue a corporate bond. 
Furthermore, the lack of institutional investors and credit-rating agencies make it 
quite difficult to price the debt accurately, and the threshold is set so high that almost 
no SMEs could tap that market. 
 
From the introduction above, we can conclude that the current framework leaves 
SMEs in a quite disadvantaged position. They have little access to the formal financial 
market. The extant studies have revealed that one critical pillar to support their 
momentous growth is their internal fund. A study (Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort, 2002) 
conducted by International Finance Corporation (IFC) showed that the owners’ capital 
and unallocated capital cover 30% and 26% of the SMEs’ capital, respectively. Due to 
the stringent criteria and license barrier, SMEs rarely raise capital in the public capital 
market, covering less than 1% of the SMEs’ capital. 
 
In accordance with the survey conducted by the Chinese Enterprise Evaluation 
Association, 48.41% of the sample enterprises choose to use their internal fund to 
expand the production while 38.39% of the sample enterprises choose to obtain a 
bank loan. Other channels constitute less than 13% of the total and only 2.38% of the 
firms choose to raise capital by issuing stocks and bonds. For bank loans, the SMEs 
mainly do business with the four state-owned banks (69.05%), while other 
commercial banks (4.76%) and local banks (5.56%) are used less often. This implies 
that the four state-owned banks play a dominant role in supporting the SME 
financing. 
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The Global Financial Crisis, which began in 2008, has worsened the financing 
problems for many SMEs in China. They suffered huge losses or even went bankrupt 
because of shrinking demand in overseas markets, increasing labor and raw material 
costs in local markets, and most importantly, a shortage of liquidity. The financial 
difficulty of SMEs has been widely recognized. According to Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2010), firms with bank financing grow faster than 
firms without external financing support. Schoar (2010) showed that the majority of 
funding for SMEs is provided through banks in developing countries. 
 
1.3. Informal finance in China and Zhejiang Province 
Since it is hard for the SMEs to raise external capital from the formal financial market 
(including the commercial banks and capital markets), they resort to the informal 
financial market. Sun (2008) proposed the concept of informal financing (civilian 
lending) from the perspective of institutional economics. Informal financing is 
defined as the direct financing activities between individuals and individuals, 
individuals and firms, firms and firms, and indirect financing activities that are aimed 
at making a profit, which are conducted by non-official financial institutions (and thus 
are excluded from the formal finance framework) and cannot be protected and 
supervised by the government rules and regulations. The informal financial market 
can be categorized into three types based on their forms and purpose (Bai and Chen, 
2004). Activities or transactions with neither legal forms nor justifiable purposes are 
referred to as black finance (the typical example is money laundering); activities or 
transactions with legal forms but no justifiable purposes are referred to as grey 
finance (the typical example is mutual guarantees among listed companies); activities 
or transactions without legal forms but justifiable purposes refers to civilian lending. 
 
For those businessmen who are eager to develop the firm while having no access to 
the formal financial market, informal finance becomes an attractive alternative. In 
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particular, they mainly rely on capital from friends, relatives, colleagues, and other 
individuals to finance various stages along the firm's life-cycle. Apart from individual 
lending, other commonly seen forms of informal finance include Rotating Savings 
and Credit Association (mainly in Fuzhou, Wenzhou, and Guangzhou), money-lenders, 
pawn shops, and cooperatives. Sun (2008) also included private equity as one form of 
the civilian lending. 
 
This thesis focuses on Zhejiang Province where SMEs play a dominant role and 
where informal finance is well developed. The case in Zhejiang Province is 
representative for China as it shares a long history of a dominant private economy and 
informal finance (Zhou and Tao, 2007). 
 
We aim to understand the status quo of the SME financing situation in Zhejiang 
Province. Specifically, we determine what type of SMEs could obtain funding from 
formal channels and what features they have, such as firm size, political connection, 
business experience, credit-rating status, etc. Furthermore, we determine the role that 
informal finance plays in SME financing and whether it is widely used or if only 
certain types of SME resort to it. The answer to this question is critical. If informal 
finance is only used by certain type of SME, pertinent micro-policies could be made 
accordingly. In contrast, if informal finance is used universally, the implication is that 
micro-policies will be ineffective, and only systematic solutions could work. 
 
With a full understanding of the SME financing status quo, we can determine where 
the problems lie. Pertinent policy recommendations could then be proposed, which 
are not only vital to the development of the SMEs themselves but also to the entire 
national economy. Moreover, guiding the informal finance to effectively alleviate the 
SMEs' financing difficulties could contribute to the financial and social stability at 
large. Therefore, it is a meaningful topic to be studied, both from a theoretical and 
practical perspective. 
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In this thesis, we gain a comprehensive view of the status quo of SME financing in 
Zhejiang Province through a questionnaire and interview. Data and material are 
first-hand and original. The research could make a contribution both in theory and 
practice. 
 
In theory, we have empirically proved that variables like political ties, credit rating, 
size, and education play a key role in formal financing in Zhejiang Province. 
Variables like credit rating and political ties always work in obtaining formal 
financing while some variables could only work in specified period, such as the 
Global Financial Crisis and the subsequently tightened monetary period (e.g., 2010–
2013). Meanwhile, we find that relationship variables like business experience could 
not play an important role as we expect. More importantly, no consistent results have 
been found for informal financing practices. In other words, none of these factors 
have a vital impact on obtaining informal financing, which could explain why 
informal financing is extensive and universal. 
 
In practice, policy suggestions have been proposed for both formal and informal 
financing from three dimensions: the fund providers for SMEs, the SMEs who need 
the funding, and the background that underpins them. These policy suggestions are 
systematic, specific, and practical. 
 
The rest of the thesis is arranged as follows: 
 
In Chapter 2, the focus is mainly on studying the status quo of the SME financing in 
Zhejiang Province and exploring the role that formal and informal financing play. By 
consulting the literature, a tailor-made questionnaire (the full copy of the 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1) has been designed to determine the basic 
information, business establishment, business growth, and funding sources of the 
firms. The copies of the questionnaire were disseminated to the sampled entrepreneurs 
of SMEs across Zhejiang Province. With the data collected from the 150 valid copies, 
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gain a brief understanding of these firms and their financing situation through basic 
descriptive statistics. 
 
In Chapter 3, we adopt various empirical methods to analyze the relationship between 
usage of formal (informal) lending and other factors. Correlation analysis, a binary 
regression model, and an ordered logistic regression model are applied on the 
collected questionnaire data. By this empirical investigation, we further explore what 
impact these reputation and relationship variables may have on the financing practices 
SMEs try to employ. 
 
From the empirical results, we find that firms with strong political ties, higher 
education, larger turnover, and having received a credit rating are more likely to 
employ formal financing practices. No consistent results are found for informal 
financing practices. Moreover, we find that more factors work in the case of the 
Global Financial Crisis while only political ties and credit-rating status work during 
the tightened monetary background, such as the period after 2010. Combining these 
results, we conclude that reputation and relationship are vital in obtaining funds from 
formal financing channels in China. By contrast, all kinds of SME entrepreneurs are 
likely to tap into the informal financing market. This finding is critical: on the one 
hand, the criteria necessary to obtain formal loans are quite stringent, while on the 
other hand, the informal market seem to set no threshold for financing. In the light of 
these considerations, informal financing will inevitably play a dominant role in the 
financial system. 
 
In Chapter 4, we first consult the extant literature to define the SME financing 
practice around the world. We then hold interviews with five managers from a 
commercial bank to understand their mindset towards SME business. Then, through 
the combination of what we find from the literature and the interviews, as well as the 
empirical results from the previous chapters, we propose specific policy suggestions. 
Policy suggestions are proposed from three different dimensions: the supply side of 
 18 
 
funds for SME financing (including both the formal and informal financial 
institutions), and the demand side. Such a wide view will offer more insightful 
understanding of SME financing. The policy suggestions proposed are explicit, 
specific, and practical. 
  
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Investigation of the status quo of SME financing in Zhejiang 
2.1 Introduction 
As the first part of the research, this chapter focuses on the status quo of the SME 
financing in Zhejiang Province and exploring the role that informal finance plays. 
Through consulting the literatures, a tailor-made questionnaire has been designed to 
determine the basic information, business establishment, business growth, and 
funding sources of the firms. The copies of the questionnaire were disseminated to the 
sampled entrepreneurs of SMEs across Zhejiang Province. With the data collected 
from 150 valid copies, a brief understanding of these firms and its financing situation 
could be gained through basic descriptive statistics. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
The purpose of This thesis is to gain a wide view of the financing practices of SMEs 
in Zhejiang Province. The financing patterns of SMEs in China’s costal region are 
determined by social and political considerations as much as economic factors. 
Scholars have attempted to study the factors pertinent to private entrepreneur 
financing. Tsai (2002) proposes a number of factors that affect the institutionalization 
of private entrepreneurs' financing, including: strength of political ties, residential 
origin, years in business, and gross annual income. Zhang (2008) blends Tsai’s 
original thoughts with the factors of the entrepreneur’s educational level and the 
firm’s credit-rating status to gain further insight. Based on their research, this section 
reviews the competing explanations regarding the SMEs' choice of financing practices, 
provides a footing to derive testable hypotheses, and proposes a systematic set of 
independent variables as explanatory factors for the research to be conducted in 
chapter 3. 
 
2.2.1 Political connection of the SMEs 
In the study of the transitional economy, the role played by non-market power, 
including social capital and political capital, has not received due attention (Fisman, 
2001; Appleton, Song, and Xia, 2005). In economics, there is no consensus on the 
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definition of the political capital, and scholars have given various explanations. Birner 
and Witter (2003) defined political capital as the resources that an actor can use to 
influence policy formation processes and achieve outcomes that serve the actor’s 
perceived interests. Such resources include being trusted by a political 
organization/network and political connections obtained through affiliation with a 
political organization/network. Political capital, however, comes from not only 
affiliation with the political organization/network, but also the activities associated 
with this affiliation or membership. Li, Meng, and Zhou (2008) think a member of the 
ruling party or having experience of serving in the army constitutes political capital. 
Fisman (2001) and Faccio, Masulis, and Mcconnell (2006) argue that if shareholders 
or members of the board with ownership of more than 10% of the company shares are 
also a member of parliament, or has a close relationship with the top leaders, then this 
counts as political capital. Chen, Lu, and He (2008) state that in China, whether the 
entrepreneur is a member of the People’s Congress (PC) or Committee of Political 
Consultative Conference denotes the strength of his/her political power. 
 
Zhou (2009) discussed some important characteristics of political capital. First, like 
financial capital, political capital can be gained through investment. For example, 
membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is considered political capital in 
China, and investment in such political capital involves making an effort to join the 
party and, in the process, subjecting oneself to a greater degree of political scrutiny 
and responsibility (Liu, 2003). Secondly, as a special type of social capital, political 
capital must be spent to be useful. Some forms of political capital, such as political 
connections, may even fragment and disorganize if left unused. Thirdly, political 
capital needs to be invested continuously. If left alone without further investment after 
obtaining membership, the value of political capital may decrease rapidly, and as one 
exits the political organization/network, political capital will generally expire. 
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2.2.1.1 Research in foreign countries 
By analyzing data from Hungary in 1992, Rona-Tas (1994) suggests that political 
power is converted into economic advantage when planned economies start to 
transform themselves into market economy systems. His research finds that the party 
bureaucrats in the previous communist regimes maintain their advantageous position 
when they become entrepreneurs and do extremely well in the business sector with 
dynamism. Wank (1995, 1999) elaborates in detail on the political dependency of 
private entrepreneurs in China. 
 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) have argued that banks politically favor connected firms in 
less-developed economies. Using a loan-level data set containing all corporate loans 
in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, they investigate political corruption in banking. 
By classifying a firm as “political” if its director participates in an election, they 
examined the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent seeking. They find 
that political firms borrow 40% more and have 50% higher default rates than other 
firms. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks while 
private banks provide no political favors. Based on these studies, it is reasonable to 
suppose that access to political and bureaucratic networks may be reflected in the 
private entrepreneurs' choice of financing strategies. 
 
2.2.1.2 Research in China 
Choi and Zhou (2001) analyze nationwide survey data from 1993 that was collected 
by the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce on 1440 sample entrepreneurs 
throughout China. They demonstrate empirically that being a cadre member has a 
positive effect on profits. They also argued that the importance of political 
connections for Chinese entrepreneurs increases as the scale of the business grows. In 
particular, state patronage is needed to help Chinese firms overcome the uncertainty 
that frequently surrounds their legal status. 
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Vicziany and Zhang (2004, 2005a) apply case studies of private enterprises in western 
China to show that political connections have been helpful for the most successful 
private entrepreneurs. The effect is especially prominent if they begin businesses as 
green-field private enterprises. Basing their work on three case studies, including two 
of Xinjiang's leading entrepreneurs, they argue that party connections help in 
developing local markets, provide clients for fledgling businesses, and facilitate 
access to credit. 
 
Xin and Pearce (1996) find that the SMEs in China place greater emphasis on the 
political capital than the SOEs and collective enterprises do. The political capital 
available to the SMEs has a dramatic influence on how much resource is accessed. 
The resource accessed includes the amelioration of the financing environment, entry 
into the highly regulated industries, and the subsidies from the state. 
 
The impact of an entrepreneur’s political capital on the financing environment is 
channeled through two channels: the replacement mechanism and the signal 
mechanism. Due to the fact that a large portion of the credit goes to the state firms, 
the political capital of the entrepreneur works as a replacement for the official support, 
and it is easier to obtain the credit in a normal situation or a bridging loan when in 
difficulty. Such replacement mechanisms are well recorded in different countries 
(Faccio, Masilis, and Mcconnell, 2006; Yu and Pan, 2008). The signal mechanism 
works because the political capital helps to alleviate the information asymmetry and 
so banks are willing to lend to these firms. If the entrepreneurs become a member of 
the People’s Congress or Committee of Political Consultative Conference, it conveys 
the signal that the firm has been widely accepted by society and the government. 
Accordingly, the bank feels more confident and grants the loan (Shao, 2011). 
 
Jiang (1999) and Zhang and Ming (2000) suggest that more and more private 
entrepreneurs have acquired membership of the People’s Congress or the Committee 
of Political Consultative Conference (CPCC). The PC is China’s legislative body and 
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the CPCC is similar to the upper house in Great Britain, but its functions are limited 
to consultation (Zhou, 2009). Although a significant proportion of the positions in 
both the PC and CPCC are preserved for current or semi-retired party/government 
officials, people from other social strata are also represented at all levels of the two 
political organs. While there were almost no private entrepreneurs in the two organs 
before the reform in 1978 because of the elimination of the whole stratum, 
entrepreneurs have been increasingly represented in both the PC and CPCC since the 
reform. By the late 1990s, around 10% of private entrepreneurs with at least eight 
employees were already members of either the PC or CPCC nationwide (Zhang and 
Ming, 1999). 
 
Zhou (2009) argued that high political capital can bring political legitimacy, thus 
helping solve the resource acquisition problem. A legislative membership signals the 
recognition of the entrepreneur’s contribution to the economy and sociopolitical order 
by the state. Therefore, entrepreneurs with legislative membership have generally 
been treated differently from other entrepreneurs when the state allocates resources. 
Thus, they may obtain government-mandated loans from the local branches of 
state-owned banks. Many private entrepreneurs in Fuyang (a county in Zhejiang 
Province), for example, have reported that they enjoyed “the freedom of doing 
business,” such as easy access to bank loans, protection from unfair competition, and 
positive media coverage only after being coopted into the PC or CPCC (He, 1999). 
 
Prominent barriers exist in many industries, such as energy and finance, and so the 
SMEs rarely have opportunities to enter these industries. Using the data of 1604 listed 
companies from 50 industries, Yuan and Shao (2010) find that the number of state 
firms increases with the level of the industry barrier and the extent of monopoly. In 
industries with a market concentration of less than 50%, private firms dominated 
while in industries with a market concentration of more than 50%, state-owned firms 
(SOEs) prevail. Using the top 100 entrepreneurs in Zhejiang Province, Hu (2006) 
finds that membership of the PC or Committee of Political Consultative Conference 
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enabled the entrepreneur to enter the highly regulated finance industry and to obtain 
the license required for financial services. 
 
The political capital could also help the SMEs to gain tax credit and various types of 
subsidies (Schleifer and Vishny, 1994; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar, 
2004; Faccio, Masulis, and Mcconnell, 2006). Chen, Li, and Yu (2009) find that the 
local government in China maintains a strong power in taxation and subsidies. Only 
the state-owned firms and those SMEs with close political relationships with the local 
government are treated favorably regarding tax and subsidies. 
 
Political capital gained from legislative membership can also help mobilize resources 
through enhancing the institutionalized social networks of the entrepreneurs. 
Sociologists have argued that social networks are often based on social similarity 
(Burt, 1992). Therefore, enjoying high-status can increase the probability of having 
other high-status people in one’s personal networks (Suchman, 1995). According to 
Zhou (2009), legislative membership, which indicates high political status, can 
increase the probability that entrepreneurs will have other politically important people, 
such as politicians, bureaucrats, bankers, or other political elites in the PC or CPCC, 
in their personal networks. These high-status contacts can provide assistance in 
solving the resource acquisition problems. Zhou (2009) explained how these contacts 
might help entrepreneurs get access to bank loans as follows: 
 
First, high-status contacts can facilitate relationship lending. The information 
asymmetry problem is especially severe in China due to the weak protection of 
private property rights. To deal with the information asymmetry problem, one 
important contracting method often used by banks is relationship lending (Berger and 
Udell, 1998; IFC, 2000). However, as discussed previously, Chinese banks have not 
usually had incentives to establish relationships with private entrepreneurs because of 
the uncertainty of the future of private businesses under the legal and regulatory 
constraints (IFC, 2000; Tsai, 2002). With legislative membership, an entrepreneur can 
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use associated high-status contacts to help establish relationships with bank officials. 
Given that direct and indirect ties between the entrepreneur and the bank officials may 
create social obligations between the two parties, which may cause them to behave 
generously toward each other (Gulati, 1995; Shane and Cable, 2002), such high-status 
contacts may facilitate access to bank financing. It could be seen that such a channel 
is similar to the signal mechanism described by Shao (2011). 
 
Secondly, some high-status contacts can even directly intervene on behalf of the 
entrepreneur in the credit decisions of banks. During most of the reform period, bank 
officials have not generally been able to make independent credit decisions, as local 
governments have had strong control over local branches of state-owned banks and 
have often intervened in their credit decisions (Naughton, 1995). In the late 1990s, 
although the central government reorganized the provincial network of the People’s 
Bank of China (the central bank) and eliminated the credit quota system in order to 
break the links between local governments and state-owned banks, local governments 
were still finding new ways to preserve some role in the allocation of financial 
resources through the banking system (IFC, 2000). With legislative membership, 
therefore, an entrepreneur can secure bank loans by using some of his/her high-status 
contacts to intervene in the credit decisions of banks on behalf of him/her. In other 
words, we could regard it as a decision-making intervention mechanism. 
 
From the literature consulted above, it could be concluded that political capital could 
function effectively in China via the following channels: 
1) As a signal of social acceptance 
2) As a replacement for official support 
3) As a direct intervention in credit decisions. 
We also know that communist party membership may not help matters while PC or 
CPCC membership can function as effective political capital. As a matter of fact, 
from the top, we have PC and CPCC from national, provincial, city and county level. 
We could expect that PC and CPCC of different layer may carry different weight. 
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2.2.2 Locality of the entrepreneur 
Zhang (2008) argues that having local social networks depends on the household 
registration status of the entrepreneurs and their length of residence in particular cities. 
Hence, it is important to differentiate between private entrepreneurs who are 
indigenous to a place and those who are migrants from other places, including other 
cities in Zhejiang Province. Discrimination against migrants in China is reasonably 
well documented. Some scholars like Day and Ma (1994) and Solinger (1999) have 
examined the nature of this discrimination with respect to the social networks of 
outsiders, as well as their employment prospects and access to political support. These 
studies both conclude that migrant entrepreneurs face more problems compared with 
their native counterparts (Solinger, 1999). In addition, residents in rural areas who 
have flocked to China's cities in recent years are generally viewed with discrimination. 
They suffer from discrimination in both the job-seeking and home-rental markets, and 
their children even have difficulty in accessing local schools (Nielsen, Smyth, and 
Zhang, 2006). Therefore, Chen (2004) argues that it is a reasonable assumption that 
the grassroots entrepreneur amongst the migrant population also suffers from relative 
marginalization. This in turn may be reflected in the choice they make about their 
financing strategies, as new migrants are probably more likely to be excluded from 
community-based financial institutions and may reluctantly try the informal financing 
channel. 
 
2.2.3 Education level of the entrepreneur 
Given that private entrepreneurs are more able to create and manage viable enterprises 
with increased human capital (Astebro and Bernhardt, 2003), it is reasonable to 
include human capital indicators in the following analysis. There are numerous 
definitions of human capital that are cited in the literature, which cover a broad 
contextual spectrum. There are, however, several recurring factors that are cited as 
relevant determinants of human capital. These include, for example, educational level, 
skill level, personal aptitude, experience, attitude, and behavior (Davenport, 1999). Of 
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these, the factor that serves as the best indicator of human capital is the level of 
education. Boshoff and Schutte (1998) argue that education level is one of the main 
predictors of entrepreneurial success in a developing country. Van-de-Ven, Hudson, 
and Schroeder (1984) and Jo and Lee (1996) find a direct and linear relationship 
between educational level and entrepreneurial performance. Moreover, Bates (1990), 
using an analysis of a nationwide random sample of 7743 small firms in the US, 
shows that entrepreneurs with higher educational qualifications are likely to raise 
funds from capital markets more easily and survive longer in the market than those 
without such qualifications. Access to formal financial sources requires more than just 
literacy for a number of specific tasks: maintaining and analyzing accounts, 
understanding the rules and procedures for bank credit, and the capacity to manage 
the accounts and books of a wide variety of financial sources in order to diversify the 
range of access to business capital. In the case of micro-credit, Li, Rozelle, and Zhang 
(2004) find that minimal educational competence is essential for reading bank 
passbooks, understanding the length and conditions of loans, and being able to 
monitor loan repayments in order to prevent fraud by the lending agency. 
 
2.2.4 Business experience of the entrepreneurs 
There is a vast literature on the impact of business experience on entrepreneurial 
performance. Financial growth-cycle theory suggests that entrepreneurs without 
sophisticated experience often started as individual entrepreneurs who could not get 
access to formal financial channels because their credit status was very low (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). As these small, private firms became better established, their 
creditworthiness and reputation improved and they developed characteristics that 
enabled formal funding institutions to better monitor loans in a manner that was not 
possible for the infant companies. More specific research has also been done to 
establish the relationship between business experience and entrepreneurial 
performance. Stuart and Abetti (1990) find a strong positive correlation between 
business experience and entrepreneurial performance, and other studies have found 
similar results (e.g., Vesper, 1980; Sandberg and Hofer, 1987). 
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2.2.5 Firm’s credit-rating status 
Many studies have examined the effect of credit scoring on small-business lending. In 
their study of large US banking organizations, Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) 
find that credit scoring was associated with an 8.4% increase in the amount of credit 
extended to small businesses. Frame, Padhi, and Woosley (2004) add two more 
dimensions to their study of the characteristics of credit-scored loan recipients: 
income levels and the location of a firm. Their results suggest that regardless of 
income level and location, credit scoring increases the average size of loans. 
Approaching the question from a different angle, Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and 
Miller (2004) examine how credit scoring reduced uncertainty about borrowers (they 
called it informational opacity) and made it possible for lenders to receive loans with 
longer repayment periods (i.e., extended loan maturity). The authors found that debt 
maturity is significantly longer for borrowers when they borrow from banks that use 
credit-scoring methods. 
 
2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 The questionnaire 
The questionnaire used in this chapter is composed of four parts, and a detailed 
introduction is presented in this section. 
 
The first part refers to basic information. It asks the respondents their personal 
information, as well as their firm’s status. Personal information includes age, gender, 
educational level, and origin (whether he/she is a local resident or not). A firm’s status 
mainly consists of the size (measured by the number of employees) and turnover 
(measured by the revenue earned last year). In order to judge to what extent the 
political factors impact the business and financing, we ask the respondents about their 
relationship with the government or SOEs. Questions were designed to ask whether 
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they themselves, or their relatives or employees, have ever worked in such institutions 
or enterprises. 
 
Yu and Pan (2008) argue the political capital of the entrepreneur functions as a 
replacement for the official support and it is easier to obtain the credit in the normal 
situation, as well as to be granted a bridging loan when in financial difficulty. Shao 
(2011) claims that if the entrepreneurs become members of the PC or CPCC, it 
conveys the signal that the firm has been widely accepted by the society and the 
government. Accordingly, the bank feels more confident and grants the loan to the 
firm. Specifically, questions like whether they are members of the PC or Committee 
of Political Consulting Conference are asked since such membership indicates 
political capital of the entrepreneur. 
 
In the second section—business establishment—the respondents are required to show 
how they started their business. Their business initiation information is determined 
from three aspects: when they start; why they choose Zhejiang Province to start (due 
to the fact that all of the respondents are entrepreneurs in Zhejiang Province); and 
through which financing channel they obtained the funds to start. The business 
experience of the entrepreneur could be extracted from the first aspect. Though no 
exact relationship exists between the age of firm and the financing channels, it is 
generally agreed that informal finance is more likely to be associated with infant or 
premature firms (Berger and Udell, 1998). To determine the reasons for choosing 
Zhejiang for the business start-up, we offer some probable explanations: better policy, 
bigger market, family bonds, and a better financing environment. Various formal and 
informal channels are also listed to check how the entrepreneurs access the capital. 
 
The third section refers to business growth. In this section, the respondents are 
required to explain how their businesses developed. We need to determine the capital 
source of the firm, including whether the capital comes from the participation of state 
and whether foreign capital has a stake in their firm. In addition, it is necessary to 
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define the industry the firm belongs to (ten industries are listed as options: food and 
beverage, textile, intermediary, paper and printing, medicine, architecture, machinery, 
artifact, electronic appliances, and furniture) and the major market they serve 
(domestic or overseas). Moreover, we asked questions regarding their operating 
conditions, which asked in a comparative manner: whether the firm’s turnover 
increased compared with that of last year and whether they have plans for further 
business expansion. Furthermore, we asked their opinions about the financing issues, 
including how they finance their business after the initial period and whether it is 
difficult for them to access further funds when needed. Similar to the arrangement in 
the second section, the financing channel used in the growth stage has also been 
included here. 
 
The last section explores the firms funding status in detail. Due to the fact that the 
banking industry dominates in China’s finance system, we begin this section by 
asking for information about the bank account of the respondents: whether they have 
a bank account and which type of bank it is. Here, we offer them four tiers of bank: 
the first tier refers to the Big-5 (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, Agriculture Bank of China, and Bank of 
Communications); the second tier is the stock-listed commercial banks; the third tier 
refers to the urban commercial banks; the fourth tier refers to the rural cooperatives. 
Then we ask whether a line of credit is applied to their business. Two types of 
questions have been designed to learn the financing environment. The respondents are 
required to answer the frequency with which they receive financing support from the 
banking institutions and non-banking sources. Secondly, the respondents are guided to 
answer their feelings regarding the financing difficulty from both banking institutions 
and non-banking sources. The same questions are applied in three different scenarios: 
in the past several years, during the Global Financial Crisis, and now. The answers to 
both types of question are measured on a Likert five-point scale. Here, we choose a 
Likert five-point scale since its range could offer sufficient information, while a Likert 
seven-point scale is redundant. 
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The respondents are provided with a wide range of financing channels in this section, 
from the most formal channel of financial institutions, like the Big-5 state-owned 
commercial banks, to the most informal channel, like the civilian lending. Unlike the 
previous two sections, the channels listed in this section have been categorized into 
two types.. Type 1 refers to the channels linked to formal financial institutions while 
type 2 is labeled as “informal finance” due to its wide coverage of informal financing 
mechanisms. Such categorization enables us to explore further in later stages of the 
research. The respondents could then pick an option and tell us why they choose one 
over another and whether there are constraints and what exactly prevents them from 
using the formal channels, or what special motives prompt them to use the informal 
channels. As well as learning about the financing from the demand side, we also 
attempt to learn it from the other way round: whether the firm has ever lent money 
informally and on what grounds they have the confidence to lend. Last, but not least, 
credit-rating status is also determined in this section. Through setting this question, 
we aim to find the proportion of firms that have a credit rating. 
 
2.3.2 The data 
The data for This thesis are collected from the results of a survey that was undertaken 
in Zhejiang Province from November 2010 to August 2011. One hundred and eighty 
questionnaires were distributed and 150 valid questionnaires were returned (feedback 
ratio: 83%). These 180 copies were randomly distributed mainly through one channel: 
the sub-branches of the commercial banks. The Zhejiang Province Private 
Entrepreneur’s Association provided us with instrumental guidance in the process. 
 
The designed questionnaires were mainly disseminated with the help of three 
commercial banks. We explained our academic purposes to the managers, and the 
staff from the loan division provided with a list of potential respondents. The 
candidates chosen are mainly clients or potential clients of these banks in Hangzhou. 
This arrangement ensures that the candidate could answer the questions in a 
 32 
 
collaborative and honest way due to consideration upon their relationship with banks. 
However, concentration in region and industry remains a problem. In order to 
diversify the client range, we contacted with Zhejiang Province Private Entrepreneur’s 
Association to seek advice. According to their proposal, the region for the survey was 
enlarged so that both geographical and industrial concentration could be alleviated. 
We then negotiated with the banks to provide us with the information for the whole of 
Zhejiang Province. From the data collected, the industry diversification is acceptable. 
 
2.4 Descriptive statistics based on the data from the feedback of the 
questionnaires 
2.4.1 Basic information 
As introduced above, the basic information was to learn the respondents’ personal 
information, as well as their firm's status. Specifically, personal information involves 
age, gender, educational level, and origin (whether he or she is a local resident or not). 
The firm’s status mainly consists of the size (the number of employees) and turnover 
(the revenue earned last year). Table 2.1 to 2.6 illustrates the detailed distribution of 
these six factors. 
 
The descriptive statistics briefly present the features of these sample SMEs and 
entrepreneurs. From Table 2.1, we learn that the entrepreneurs are mainly in the range 
of 20–39 years old. Seven respondents are in the range of below 20 years old; a 
probable explanation for candidates so young is that they may be the children or 
grandchildren of older entrepreneurs of a family business. In Zhejiang Province, there 
are many family businesses, and whether the firm should be run by the family 
members or external managers is a topic that attracts public attention. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ age. 
 
Age 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of the 
whole sample  
<20 7 4.67% 
20–29 58 38.67% 
30–39 32 21.33% 
40–49 23 15.33% 
>50 30 20.00% 
Total 150 100% 
 
From Table 2.2, in our sample, respondents’ gender is basically balanced, with more 
than 40% of the respondents being female. An explanation for this is that Zhejiang is 
characterized by a long history of private business, and discrimination against females 
is not part of the local tradition. Indeed, succession of family businesses in Zhejiang 
Province or choosing entrepreneurs mainly focuses on the candidate’s management 
skills and inner quality rather than merely their gender. 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ gender. 
 
Gender 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Male 87 58.0% 
Female 63 42.0% 
Total 150 100% 
 
From Table 2.3, we see that more than 80% of the respondents have received 
education to at least the level of senior high-school. Over 45% have studied in 
universities while only 18% of the respondents received relatively only a lower level 
of education. 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ education level. 
Education level 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Primary school 12 8.0% 
Junior 
middle-school 
15 10.0% 
Senior high-school 30 20.0% 
Vocational training 25 16.7% 
College 45 30.0% 
Graduate school  23 15.3% 
Total 150 100% 
 
From Table 2.4, 43% of the entrepreneurs are indigenous to Zhejiang Province. As the 
sample was chosen randomly, to some extent it could be seen as evidence to prove 
that Zhejiang Province is inclusive and friendly to outsiders. 
 
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ origin. 
Local or not 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of the 
whole sample  
Local 65 43.3% 
Not local 85 56.7% 
Total 150 100% 
 
From Table 2.5, most of the firms (93.33%) have more than 10 employees. Due to the 
very rare cases of getihu, we tend not to categorize the sample into the two types: 
getihu
1
 and siyingqiyejia
2
 (firms with more than eight employees) as Zhang (2008) 
did. About 28% and 29% of firms have employees in the range 10–50 and 100–499, 
respectively. From Table 2.6, more than 70% of the sample firms have earned revenue 
                                                        
1
 GETIHU refers to the entrepreneur whose firm has fewer than eight employees. 
2
 SIYINGQIYEJIA refers to the entrepreneur whose firm has more than eight 
employees). 
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of more than 1 million Chinese Yuan, of which about 37% reached 10 million Chinese 
Yuan. 
 
Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics of the number of respondents’ employees. 
 
Number of firm’s 
respondents’ employees 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
0–10 10 6.7% 
10–50 42 28.0% 
50–100 30 20.0% 
100–499 43 28.7% 
500–999 20 13.3% 
>1000 5 3.3% 
Total 150 100% 
 
 
Table 2.6 Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ firm's turnover. 
 
Range Number Percentage 
<100,000 12 8.0% 
100,000–999,999 30 20.0% 
1,000,000–9,999,999 53 35.3% 
>10,000,000 55 36.7% 
Total 150 100% 
 
Table 2.7 presents the political connection of the entrepreneurs. From Part A, we find 
that only 10% of the respondents have served in SOE or government institutions. Of 
these 15, 11 chose to continue answering the following questions. Among them, 10 
once worked in institutions; all were managerial staff and 8 of them worked with the 
post of chief leader. Three of the 11 even are members of PC or CPCC member. 
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Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ political connections. 
Part A 
Experience of the respondents or any other member of senior management 
serving in a government working unit or SOEs 
a. Having served in SOE 
or government institutions 
Number Percentage 
Yes 15 10.0% 
No 135 90.0% 
 
Part B 
The type of government working unit the respondents or any other member of 
senior management served 
b. Type of government unit or SOE Number Percentage 
Government 
bureau/department/committee/institution  
10 6.7% 
State-owned enterprise 0 0.0% 
 
Part C 
Level of the position the respondents or any other member of senior management 
in the government working unit 
c. Level of the position Number Percentage 
Chief leader/CEO 8 5.33% 
Department chief/manager 3 2.00% 
Ordinary staff 0 0.00% 
 
Part D 
Whether relatives or friends that have a relationship with the government unit or 
stated-owned enterprises 
d. Relatives of friends Number Percentage 
Yes 3 2.00% 
No 8 5.33% 
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Part E 
Whether the respondents or any other member of senior management has been 
elected as a congressman (PC or CPCC member). 
e. PC or CPCC Number Percentage 
Yes 3 2.00% 
No 8 5.33% 
 
Part F. Employees that have relationships with government units or SOEs 
f. Employees that have 
relationships with 
government units or 
SOEs 
Number Percentage 
Yes 3 2.00% 
No 8 5.33% 
 
2.4.2 Business establishment 
Due to the fact the respondents could make multiple choices to the problem “Why 
they chose Zhejiang to start their business,” the sum of the number may not 
necessarily add to 150, i.e., the sample size. From the results listed in Table 2.8, about 
60 people chose the reason “bigger market” while 50 made the choice because of 
being indigenous to Zhejiang Province. The number 50 is smaller than 65 (the number 
who are indigenous) indicating that not all of the local people feel it is more 
convenient and meaningful to do business in their hometown. It is worth mentioning 
that only eight people chose the reason “better financing opportunities,” indicating 
that the financing environment is far from satisfactory despite the existence of a 
developed and active informal lending market. 
 
Looking further into the financing channels, we see that 60 people rely on internal 
financing rather than seeking funds from outside. Only 48 firms have successfully 
obtained loans from the banks, and a rather small proportion (only 8 firms) of firms 
have been granted subsidies from the government. Meanwhile, 17 firms go to the 
most informal financing channels: pawn shops. 
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Table 2.8 Descriptive statistics of reasons for choosing Zhejiang Province to start 
the business. 
Reasons for choosing 
Zhejiang Province to start 
the business 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of the 
whole sample  
Better policy environment 20 13.33% 
Bigger market 60 40.00% 
Easier access to supply 
materials 
25 16.67% 
I’m a native of Zhejiang  50 33.33% 
Better financing 
opportunities 
8 5.33% 
 
Table 2.9 Descriptive statistics of financing channels chosen by the respondents. 
 
Financing channels 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of the 
whole sample  
Internal finance (including family member 
contribution) 
60 40.00% 
Pawn shop 17 11.33% 
Cooperative 25 16.67% 
Bank loans 48 32.00% 
Government institutions 8 5.33% 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of entrepreneur’s business experience in the sample. 
The pattern is skewed to the right, which indicates that a large proportion of the 
entrepreneurs have fewer years of business experience. Entrepreneurs having six 
years of experience recorded the highest percentage. Experienced entrepreneurs are 
rare in our sample since the proportion of those having more than 13 years is quite 
low. Table 2.10 shows that the mean value of the respondent’s business experience is 
about 6 years. 
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Figure 2.1 Description of business experience. 
 
 
Table 2.10 Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ business experience. 
 
Business experience 
（Years） 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 21 7.36 2.71 
 
2.4.3 Business growth 
From Table 2.11, we can see that the sample is quite diversified in terms of industry 
distribution and that there is no evident industry concentration. The sum of industries 
respondents are part of for all the samples indicates that some firms may do business 
across industries. After initial success in the industry that they were familiar with, 
many SMEs chose to diversify their business. They started to enter into industries that 
seem to be lucrative but which they are quite unfamiliar with. In some cases, that 
might just be the beginning of the final collapse and bankruptcy of the firms. 
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Table 2.11 Descriptive statistics of the distribution of the industries of the 
respondents were part of. 
 
Industry of 
respondents  
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of the 
whole sample  
Food and 
beverage 
10 6.67% 
Textile 22 14.67% 
Intermediary 28 18.67% 
Paper and 
printing 
7 4.67% 
Medicine 8 5.33% 
Architecture 15 10.00% 
Machinery 15 10.00% 
Artifact 10 6.67% 
Electronic 
appliances 
22 14.67% 
Furniture 18 12.00% 
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Table 2.12 Descriptive statistics of market served by the respondents 
 
Market served  
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of the 
whole sample  
Domestic 
market 
105 70% 
Foreign market 48 32% 
 
As for the markets served, over two-thirds of the sample firms are home-market 
oriented while less than one third serve the foreign market. A simple arithmetic 
calculation tells us that three forms of the whole sample served both the domestic 
markets and overseas. A probable explanation is that these three firms have a wider 
range of products that could serve the need of both domestic and overseas customers’ 
needs. 
 
Table 2.13 Descriptive statistics of respondents’ revenue growth in the past year. 
 
Revenue growth 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
of the 
whole 
sample  
Increased by 0–20% 58 38.67% 
Increased by 20–50% 30 20.00% 
Increased by 50–100% 13 8.67% 
Increased by more than 100% 23 15.33% 
About the same 3 2.00% 
Decline 23 15.33% 
 
From Table 2.13, we see that more than 80% of the enterprises recorded growth in the 
past year, and of these, about 40% of the enterprises have reaped modest growth while 
44% have achieved a promising performance. A strong performance may indicate that 
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the firms are financially healthy, and it is reasonable to deduce that they could 
withstand relatively high financing costs. 
 
When asked whether they regard financing as a constraint for their business expansion, 
more than half of the sample firms answered “yes.” The figures for the answers 
presented in Table 2.14 are exactly the same when they were asked whether they had 
difficulty in obtaining funds during the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Table 2.15 presents the choice of the financing channel of the sample firms when they 
expand their business. A first look at the table shows that no firms have answered 
beyond the 5-year range, probably because the entrepreneurs may not share a vivid 
memory about how they financed their growth in the remote past. 
 
Looking further into the available information, we find that it is likely that firms tend 
to use multiple channels rather than maintaining just one. Using more than one 
channel could ensure the liquidity and safety of the firms under most situations. 
Among the channels used, trade credit is used most frequently, followed by informal 
channels and retained earnings. Financing through formal financing institutions, like 
banks and credit unions, is rather scarce. The usage of direct financing channels is 
rarely recorded (10 firms obtained funds through issuing debt instruments while no 
firms accessed equity funds). 
 
Table 2.14 Descriptive statistics of respondents’ perception of financing difficulty. 
 
Perception of financing difficulty 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
of the 
whole 
sample  
Financing is difficult 80 53.33% 
Financing is not difficult 70 46.67% 
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Table 2.15 Descriptive statistics of respondents’ usage of financing channels for 
business expansion. 
 
Usage of financing channels for 
business expansion with the 
contract terms set between 0–5 
years 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
of the 
whole 
sample  
Retained earnings 43 28.67% 
Trade credit 88 58.67% 
Bank loans 12 8.00% 
Credit union loans 13 8.67% 
Corporate bonds 10 6.67% 
External equity 0 0.00% 
Informal channels 50 33.33% 
 
From the data collected through the questionnaires, we found quite limited 
information about firms' ownership. None of the respondents answered whether any 
stakes are owned by the state. Only 12 people chose to reply that their firms are joint 
ventures. From such feedback, it seems that ownership may remain something that the 
entrepreneurs avoid answering questions about directly. 
 
2.4.4 Funding source 
From Table 2.16, we see that all of the sample firms owned a bank account. However, 
fewer firms (merely 6.67%) have used a line of credit. The information retrieved from 
the questionnaire also showed that most of the accounts are in the Big-5 state-owned 
banks and large stock-listed commercial banks. 
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Table 2.16 Descriptive statistics of respondents’ usage of bank accounts and 
credit lines. 
  
Number of 
respondents 
using source 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Number of 
respondents 
not using 
source 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Bank 
account 
150 100% 0 0% 
Line of 
credit 
10 6.67% 140 93.33% 
 
 
Table 2.17 Descriptive statistics of reasons for obtaining loans from the banking 
institutions. 
 
Probable reasons for obtaining 
loan from the banking institutions 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Start-up capital requirement 0 0.00% 
Fixed asset investment 13 8.67% 
Current asset needs 50 33.33% 
Research and development 30 20.00% 
Personnel training 30 20.00% 
Other 0 0.00% 
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Table 2.18 Descriptive statistics of reasons for failure to obtain loan from the 
banking institutions. 
 
Probable reasons for failure to 
obtain loan from the banking 
institutions 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Small scale of the business 18 12.00% 
Not state owned 13 8.67% 
No credit guarantee 28 18.67% 
No qualified collateral 12 8.00% 
Policy constraints 27 18.00% 
Lack of creditworthiness and 
government connections 
2 1.33% 
Lack of business influence 3 2.00% 
Other 8 5.33% 
 
Table 2.17 and Table 2.18 present various reasons for the success or failure to obtain 
loan from the banking institutions. Current asset needs, research and development 
expenditures, and personnel training are the main reasons accepted by the commercial 
banks. It is worth noting that the success in obtaining loads for research and 
development expenditure and personnel training could imply that there is policy 
inclination toward some industries, but this needs to be proved with further empirical 
studies in the future. 
 
Meanwhile, a lack of credit guarantee, policy constraints, and scale of the business are 
the main obstacles for firms to be granted loans. The implication is that sufficient 
credit risk mitigation schemes, such as providing collateral or third-party guarantees, 
carries much weight for SME financing. In addition, more should be done to alleviate 
policy bottlenecks and prejudice against SMEs. Another implicit reason that is not 
listed in the items is location discrimination. 
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Similar to the results of the banking institutions, current asset needs and research and 
development are the main reasons for obtaining funds from non-banking institutions. 
The reasons for failure to access such funds from these channels include a lack of 
creditworthiness, no credit guarantee, and the small scale of the business. The only 
difference is that social networking and personal relationships are much more 
important in informal financing, which agrees with Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005). 
 
Table 2.19 Descriptive statistics of reasons for obtaining loans from non-banking 
institutions. 
 
Probable reasons for obtaining 
loans from non-banking 
institutions 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Start-up capital requirement 3 2.00% 
Fixed asset investment 8 5.33% 
Current asset needs 40 26.67% 
Research and development 30 20.00% 
Personnel training 3 2.00% 
Other 13 8.67% 
 
 
Table 2.20 Descriptive statistics of reasons for failure to obtain loans from 
non-banking institutions. 
 
Probable reasons for failure to 
obtain loans from non-banking 
institutions 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Small scale of the business 15 10.00% 
No credit guarantee 25 16.67% 
Lack of creditworthiness 28 18.67% 
No good project 10 6.67% 
Lack of social network 3 2.00% 
Other 15 10.00% 
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In the fourth section, we have provided a variety of financing channels for the 
respondents to choose from. These financing channels are categorized into two types: 
type 1 channels are mainly formal institutions, including the Big 5 commercial banks, 
stock-listed commercial banks, and rural credit cooperatives while the type 2 channels 
are mainly informal channels, including seeking funds from friends, relatives, 
colleagues, upstream suppliers, downstream merchants, loan-sharks, and pawn shops. 
Type 2 channels could be seen as informal lending. Table 2.21 shows that 43.33% of 
the sample firms have used the more formal channels while 38% have used informal 
lending. One probable drawback of the demarcation is that there are other channels, 
such as internal financing, which are not included in these two types. 
 
Table 2.21 Descriptive statistics of use of formal and informal financing 
 
Use of formal and informal 
financing 
Number of 
respondents 
having used 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Number of 
respondents 
not having 
used 
Percentage 
of the 
whole 
sample  
Type 1 channels 65 43.33% 85 56.67% 
Type 2 channels 57 38.00% 93 62.00% 
 
According to Table 2.22, about one-fourth of the firms have a credit rating. Firms that 
have completed such a procedure are more inclined to approach formal financing 
channels since their financial health and strength have been monitored by a third party, 
and thus the information asymmetry could be alleviated to some extent. Empirical 
tests are conducted in the next chapter to show whether such deduction holds. 
 
 48 
 
Table 2.22 Descriptive statistics of firm’s credit rating status. 
Credit rating status 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
the whole 
sample  
Have a credit rating 38 25.33% 
Do not have a credit rating 112 74.67% 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focused on the status quo of SME financing in Zhejiang Province 
and explored the role played by formal and informal financing. By consulting the 
literature, we designed a tailor-made questionnaire to learn basic information, such as 
business establishment, business growth, and funding sources of the firms. Our data 
enable us to gain an understanding of these firms and their financing situation. In next 
chapter, we further explore the data to determine the respondents’ characteristics that 
enable them to obtain funds from the formal and informal funding markets. 
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Appendix 1: The questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is only for academic application. If you feel uncomfortable 
with any of the questions, you do not need to answer them. 
 
I. Basic information 
1. Please indicate your age 
 Under 20 
 20–29 
 30–39 
 40–49 
 Over 50 
 
2. Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
3. Education level 
 Primary school 
 Junior middle-school 
 Senior high-school 
 Vocational training 
 College 
 Graduate school 
 
4. Are you a native of Zhejiang? 
 Yes 
 No 
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5. Size of your business/firm (number of employees) 
 0–10 
 10–50 
 50–100 
 100–499 
 500–999 
 More than 1000 
 
6. Annual business turnover (RMB) in the last 12 months 
 Less than 100,000 
 100,000–999,999 
 1,000,000–9,999,999 
 10,000,000 or more 
 
7. Connection with government or state-owned enterprises 
7a. Do you or any other member of senior management work in a government 
working unit or state-owned enterprise? 
 Yes (if yes, please continue to answer the following questions) 
 No (if no, please continue with question 8) 
7b. Could you please specify the type of government working unit? 
 Government bureau/department/committee/institution 
 State-owned enterprise 
7c. What level is the position in the government working unit? 
 Chief leader/CEO 
 Section chief/manager 
 Ordinary staff 
7d. Do you have any relatives or friends that have a relationship with a 
government working unit or stated-owned enterprise? 
 Yes 
 No 
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7e. Have you or any other member of senior management been elected as a 
congressman (PC or CPCC member)? 
 Yes 
 No 
7f. Do you have any employees that have a relationship with a government 
working unit or stated owned enterprise? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
II. Business establishment 
8. Why did you choose Zhejiang to start your business? 
 Better policy environment 
 Bigger market 
 Easier access to supply materials 
 I’m a native of Zhejiang 
 Better financing opportunities 
 Other (please specify) 
 
9. In which year did you/your firm commence business activities? 
 
10. Where did you get your start-up financing? 
 Self-financed (including family member contribution) 
 Pawn shop 
 Cooperative 
 Bank loans 
 Government institutions 
 Other (please specify) 
 
11. Does the state have any ownership of your firm? If so, what is the 
proportion? 
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12. Is your company a joint venture? If so, what is the proportion of foreign 
ownership? 
 
III. Business growth 
13. Which industry is your company in? If your company is involved in more 
than one industry, please specify the main business 
 Food and beverage 
 Textile 
 Intermediary 
 Paper and printing 
 Medicine 
 Architecture 
 Machinery 
 Artifact 
 Electronic appliance 
 Furniture 
 
14. Does your company mainly serve the domestic market, the foreign market, or 
both? 
 Domestic market 
 Foreign market 
 Both 
 
15. What is the annual turnover of your business compared with last year? 
 Increased by 0–20% 
 Increased by 20–50% 
 Increased by 50–100% 
 Increased by >100% 
 About the same 
 53 
 
 Decreased 
 
16. a. Do you regard financing difficulties as a constraint for the growth of your 
business? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
b. What other serious constraints did you face in the start? 
 No new project 
 No access to local market 
 Lack of skilled personnel 
 Heavy tax burden 
 Competition from other firms 
 Other (please specify) 
 
c. Did you have difficulty in obtaining finance during the Global Financial 
Crisis? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
17. Have you ever thought of issuing stock to expand your business? 
 Yes 
 No 
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18. When and where did you obtain additional finance for expansion? (Please 
tick when the option applied) 
 
 
IV. Funding source 
19.  a. Does your business have a bank account? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
b. If so, where? (Please tick which option applied) 
 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
 Bank of China 
 China Construction Bank 
 Agriculture Bank of China 
 Bank of Communications 
 China Ever-Bright Bank 
 CITIC Industrial Bank 
 China Minsheng Bank 
 China Merchants Bank 
 Huaxia Bank 
 Zheshang Bank 
 Rural Credit Cooperatives 
 Other (please specify) 
 
c. Has your firm ever used a line of credit? 
First 5 years
Second 5
years
Last 5 years
Retained earnings
Suppliers
Bank loans
Credit Union loans
Corporate Bonds
External Equity
Informal Channels    
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20. a. How often have you used the following channels for financial support in 
the last 12 months? 
 
b. How often have you used the following channels for financial support in the 
first year of your business? 
 
c. How easy has it been for you in the past to obtain financial support from the 
following sources in Zhejiang? Please tick number from 1 to 5 as appropriate to 
each factor. 
 
d. How easy has it been for you during the Global Financial Crisis to obtain 
financial support from the following sources in Zhejiang? Please tick number 
from 1 to 5 as appropriate to each factor. 
 
e. How easy is it for you NOW to obtain financial support from the following 
sources in Zhejiang? Please tick number from 1 to 5 as appropriate to each 
factor. 
 
 
21. a. What are the main reasons for you requiring a banking loan? 
 Start-up capital requirement 
No of times Never Once Less than 5 More than 10 More than
20
Local Banks
Non-bank source
No of times Never Once Less than 5 More than 10 More than
20
Local Banks
Non-bank source
Very easy Neutral Very hard
Access from local
banks
1 2 3 4 5
Access from Non-
bank source
1 2 3 4 5
Very easy Neutral Very hard
Access from local
banks
1 2 3 4 5
Access from Non-
bank source
1 2 3 4 5
Very easy Neutral Very hard
Access from local
banks
1 2 3 4 5
Access from Non-
bank source
1 2 3 4 5
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 Fixed asset investment 
 Current asset needs 
 Research and development 
 Personnel training 
 Other (please specify) 
 
b. What are the main reasons for you accessing non-banking finance? 
 Start-up capital requirement 
 Fixed asset investment 
 Current asset needs 
 Research and development 
 Personnel training 
 Other (please specify) 
 
c. If you were unable to obtain bank finance, what are the main reasons for this? 
Pick up to three options. 
 Small scale of the business 
 Not state owned 
 No credit guarantee 
 No qualified collateral 
 Policy constraints 
 Lack of creditworthiness 
 Lack of government connections 
 Lack of business influence 
 Other (please specify) 
 
d. What are the main reasons for not being able to obtain non-banking finance? 
 Small scale of the business 
 No credit guarantee 
 Lack of creditworthiness 
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 No good project 
 Lack of social network 
 Other (please specify) 
 
22.  Has your business ever borrowed money from the following lending 
institutions? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please fill in the following table 
 
 
23. Has your business ever borrowed money from the following? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please fill in the following table 
 
When Amount length Collateral(Y/N) Purpose
loan
Satisfaction
(Y/N)
Interest
Rate
Industrial and
Commercial Bank
of China
Bank of China
China Construction
Bank
Agriculture Bank of
China
Bank of
Communications
China Ever-bright
Bank
CITIC Industrial
Bank
China Minsheng
Bank
China Merchants
Bank
Huaxia Bank
Zheshang Bank
Rural Credit
Cooperatives
Others (Please
specify)
When Amount length Collateral(Y/N) Purpose
loan
Satisfaction
(Y/N)
Interest
Rate
Friend
Relative
Colleague
Upstream Suppliers
Downstream
merchants
Loan shark
Pawn shop
Cooperatives
Others (Please
specify)
 58 
 
 
24. Has your business ever issued any stock shares to the public? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please fill in the following table 
 
 
25. Have you ever lent money to a friend’s or relative’s business? 
 Yes 
 No 
If so, what are the reasons? 
 Friend/relative has qualified collateral 
 Friend has capability 
 Friend is trustworthy 
 Friend has good feasibility study for his/her plan 
 Purely friendship 
 
26.  Has your business have a credit rating? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
27.  Other issues 
If there are other important aspects to the growth of your business that the previous 
questions did not identify, please feel free to write them in the space provided below. 
  
When Amount Purpose of stock issue Satisfaction (Y/N)
Shanghai Stock
Exchange
Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
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Chapter 3 Gaining further insight into SME financing in Zhejiang 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, we mainly focuses on the status quo of SME financing in Zhejiang 
Province and exploring the role played by formal and informal financing. Through 
consulting the literature, we have designed a tailor-made questionnaire to learn the 
basic information, such as business establishment, business growth, and funding 
sources, of the firms. With the data collected from the 150 valid copies of the 
questionnaire, a brief understanding of these firms and their financing situation has 
been gained. In this chapter, we adopt various empirical methods to analyze the 
relationship between the use of formal (informal) lending and other factors. 
Correlation analysis, a binary regression model, and an ordered logistic regression 
model are applied to the collected questionnaire data. With this empirical 
investigation, we further explore what impact these reputation and relationship 
variables may have on the financing practices these firms employ. The investigation 
of the status of the SMEs' financing situation in this chapter will provide a vital 
footing for policy suggestions to be proposed in the next chapter. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
In this section, we propose six hypotheses based on the relevant literature. 
 
Rona-Tas (1994) suggests that political power is converted into economic advantage 
when planned economies start to transform themselves into market systems. In his 
paper, he found that the ex-communist cadres or party bureaucrats maintain their 
advantageous position when they become entrepreneurs and that these entrepreneurs 
do extremely well in the dynamic business sector. Vicziany and Zhang (2004, 2005a) 
conducted case studies of private enterprises in western China and showed that 
political connections are helpful for the most successful private entrepreneurs, 
especially if they begin business as green-field private enterprises. Based on three 
case studies, including two of Xinjiang's leading millionaire entrepreneurs, they show 
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that party connections help in developing local markets, provide clients for fledgling 
businesses, and facilitate access to credit. 
 
Zhou (2009) conducted regression analysis and suggested that legislative membership 
is associated with a lower self-reported degree of difficulty in obtaining bank loans 
and a higher probability of access to bank loans for private entrepreneurs, that 
higher-level legislative membership is more useful in solving bank financing 
obstacles, and that such memberships in general are more helpful for SMEs. 
 
Choi and Zhou (2001) also argued that the importance of political connections for 
Chinese entrepreneurs increased as the scale of the business grows. State patronage, in 
particular, was needed to help Chinese firms overcome the uncertainty that frequently 
surrounded their legal status. Khwaja and Mian (2005) argue that banks favor 
politically connected firms in less developed economies. Zhang (2008) argues that 
access to political and bureaucratic networks may be reflected in the private 
entrepreneurs' choice of financing strategies. 
 
Nofsinger and Wang (2011) find that the legal environment is important for access to 
external financing. The amount and diversity of sources of external financing are 
associated with high levels of property rights, contract enforcement, and corruption 
protection. 
 
Ruziev and Midmore (2015) investigate the effects of interpersonal links with 
bureaucrats on SME access to formal finance. A survey of 502 SMEs in 
post-communist Uzbekistan showed that fewer SMEs with government connections 
express a need for external finance and that the success rates of applications for loans 
are higher for SMEs with connections compared to those without connections. 
Econometric models show that government-connected SMEs receive more formal 
credit than their counterparts. The small share of SME credit available is thus 
distributed to those capitalizing on bureaucratic links, which leads to resource 
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misallocation. These findings imply that greater SME credit flow require an 
improvement in bank transparency and efficiency. 
 
Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with close political or bureaucratic ties are more likely to use 
formal financing than those with fewer political connections. 
 
Solinger (1999) concludes that migrant entrepreneurs face more problems compared 
with their native counterparts in employment prospects and access to political support. 
Zhao (2003) found that migrant networks play an important role in the survival of 
new migrants and that experienced migrants have a positive and significant effect on 
subsequent migration. In some cases, the migration of people is driven by 
entrepreneurial ambition, as in the case of the minority Uygur who have migrated 
from Xinjiang to Beijing and Shanghai (Vicziany and Zhang, 2005b). Zhang (2008) 
found that even migrants who are able to develop their own financial responses to 
capital scarcity face more political, bureaucratic, and community obstacles in 
accessing local capital sources beyond their immediate family, relatives, and migrant 
community. 
 
Chen (2004) argues that it would be a reasonable assumption that the raw 
entrepreneurs amongst the migrant population also suffer from relative 
marginalization. Since they could not obtain the funds from the community, they may 
have to tap into the informal channel. Vos, Yeh, and Carter (2007) find that social 
networks and connections are important for accessing finance. Zhang (2008) showed 
that a native of Chengdu is more likely to employ formal financing practices than 
immigrants by empirical investigation. 
 
Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Native entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal financing than 
immigrant entrepreneurs. 
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Boshoff and Schutte (1998) argue that education level is one of the main predictors of 
entrepreneurial success in a developing country. Li, Rozelle, and Zhang (2004) found 
that minimal educational competence is essential for reading bank passbooks, 
understanding the length and conditions of loans, and being able to monitor loan 
repayments in order to prevent fraud by the lending agency. In a study by Vos, Yeh, 
and Carter (2007) using UK and US data, they find that younger and less educated 
SME owners are more likely to actively seek external financing than older and more 
educated SME owners. Nofsinger and Wang (2011) studied the determinants of 
external financing in initial firm start-ups in 27 countries and found that 
entrepreneurial experience is helpful in obtaining financing from institutional 
investors. 
 
Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Entrepreneurs with a higher education level are more likely to use 
formal financing than those with a lower education level. 
 
Stuart and Abetti (1990) established the relationship between business experience and 
entrepreneurial performance and found a strong positive correlation, and other studies 
have found similar results. (e.g. Sandberg & Hofer, 1987; Vesper, 1980). 
 
Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurs with longer-term business experience are more likely to 
use formal financing than those with shorter-term business experience. 
 
Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) find that credit scoring is associated with an 
8.4% increase in the amount of credit extended to small businesses. Frame, Padhi, and 
Woosley (2004) used two additional dimensions in their study of the characteristics of 
credit-scored loan recipients: income levels and the location of a firm. Frame, Padhi, 
and Woosley (2004) use the US case to examine how credit scoring reduced 
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uncertainty about borrowers (known as informational opacity) and made it possible 
for lenders to provide loans with longer repayment periods (namely, extended loan 
maturity). 
 
Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms that have received a credit rating are more likely to use formal 
financing than those that have not. 
 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) argued that the amount of information banks can acquire is 
usually much less in the case of smaller firms due to limited information about their 
investment opportunities and managerial capabilities. In addition, the extent of credit 
rationing applied to small firms might occur simply because they are not well 
collaterized. De la Torre, Soledad, Pería, and Schmukler (2010) also attribute difficult 
in SME access to finance to opaqueness that makes it difficult to ascertain whether 
firms have the capacity (by investing in viable projects) and the willingness (moral 
hazard factors) to pay. This opaqueness particularly undermines credit access from 
institutions that engage in more impersonal or arms-length financing, which requires 
hard, objective, and transparent information. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) also argue 
that firm size itself is a critical determinant in accessing external finance. The 
International Finance Corporation (2000) argues that smaller businesses are less able 
to provide appropriate information (financial statements) when applying for credit 
through formal financial institutions, and hence, they tend to employ informal 
financing practices due to the low requirements for information. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) find that small firms and firms in countries 
with poor institutions use less external finance, especially bank finance, leasing, or 
trade finance, compared with larger firms. They also find that larger firms can more 
easily expand their external financing when they are financially constrained than can 
small firms, and they find suggestive evidence supporting the pecking order 
hypothesis across countries. 
 
 64 
 
Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Firms with a larger turnover are more likely to use formal financing 
than those with a smaller turnover. 
 
3.3 Research design 
In Chapter 2, we have collected data from 150 valid questionnaires, and basic 
descriptive analysis was also conducted. In this chapter, we further reveal the 
relationship between the usage of formal (informal) financing channels and firm 
characteristics with correlation and regression analyses. 
 
The main equations to be tested are as follows: 
Binary regression: 
UFM = C (1)*POL + C (2)*NAT + C (3)*EDU + C (4)*BEX + C (5)*CRE + C 
(6)*SIZE + C +ε;                                                   [1] 
 
UIFM = C (1)*POL + C (2)*NAT + C (3)*EDU + C (4)*BEX + C (5)*CRE + C 
(6)*SIZE +C +ε;                                                    [2] 
 
Ordered regression: 
FDC = C (1)*POL + C (2)*NAT + C (3)*EDU + C (4)*BEX + C (5)*CRE + C 
(6)*SIZE+ C +ε;                                                    [3] 
 
FDP = C (1)*POL + C (2)*NAT + C (3)*EDU + C (4)*BEX + C (5)*CRE + C 
(6)*SIZE +C +ε;                                                    [4] 
 
FDN = C (1)*POL + C (2)*NAT + C (3)*EDU + C (4)*BEX + C (5)*CRE + C 
(6)*SIZE +C +ε;                                                    [5] 
 
Here, we give the definition of the dependent and independent variables in advance. 
Dependent variables: 
UFM stands for the respondent’s use of formal financing channels; the value is from 
question 22. UFM with value “1” means that the respondent has used the formal 
financing channels while UFM with value “0” means the opposite. By definition, it is 
a dichotomous variable. 
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UIFM stands for the respondent’s use of informal financing channels; the value is 
from question 23. UIFM with value “1” means that the respondent has used the 
informal financing channels while UIFM with value “0” means the opposite. By 
definition, it is a dichotomous variable. 
 
FDC stands for the respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from formal 
financing channels during the recent international financial crisis; the value is from 
question 20. FDC ranges from 1 to 5 (1 = very easy, 5 = very difficult). By definition, 
it is an ordered variable. 
 
FDP stands for the respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from formal 
financing channels in the past; the value is from question 20. FDP ranges from 1 to 5 
(1 = very easy, 5 = very difficult). By definition, it is an ordered variable. 
 
FDN stands for the respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from formal 
financing channels now; the value is from question 20. FDN ranges from 1 to 5 (1 = 
very easy, 5 = very difficult). By definition, it is an ordered variable. 
 
Due to the fact that in questions 20a, 20b, and 20c, the respondents chose to answer 
the question in the first line but neglected to answer the second line, we have collected 
the full sample from the first line. Therefore, FDC, FDP, and FDN are also retrieved 
from the first line from 20d, 20c, and 20e (namely, the formal financing channels). 
 
Independent variables: 
POL stands for political or bureaucratic connections of the respondents; the value is 
from question 7a. POL with value “1” means that there are political or bureaucratic 
connections while POL with value “0” means the opposite. The reason for the 
selection is that all the respondents answered question 7a while questions 7b to 7g 
were rarely answered. By definition, it is a dichotomous variable. According to Choi 
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and Zhou (2001) and Zhang (2008), entrepreneurs with strong political ties in China 
can easily obtain funds from the formal channels. Hence, we predict that a positive 
relationship exists between POL and UFM. Similarly, firms without such political ties 
may have to tap the informal financing markets to obtain funds. As for FDC, FDP, 
and FDN, we predict that closer political ties will enable the entrepreneur to access 
the funds more easily from the formal financing channel. In China, firms with strong 
political connections are likely to obtain funds while merely having such funds is not 
helpful in building or strengthening political connections. Hence, the variable POL 
cannot be endogenous. 
 
NAT stands for respondents’ origin, the value that is retrieved from question 4. NAT 
with value “1” means that the respondent is a native of Zhejiang Province while NAT 
with value “0” means the opposite. By definition, it is a dichotomous variable. From 
the business practice, local people may find it easier to obtain funds from formal 
channels especially in urban and rural cooperatives. Moreover, due to their residence 
in Zhejiang Province, it is also highly likely that they shall have access to the “local 
civilian lending.” Hence, it is likely that a positive relationship exists between NAT 
and UFM (UIFM). As for FDC, FDP, and FDN, we predict that native entrepreneurs 
will find it easier to access funds from the formal financing channel. In Zhejiang 
Province, local entrepreneurs are likely to obtain funds while there is no relationship 
between having obtained funds and being local people. Hence, the variable NAT 
cannot be endogenous. 
 
EDU stands for the education level of the respondent; the value is from question 3. 
EDU with value “1” means that the education level is primary school; EDU with 
value “2” means that the education level is junior middle-school; EDU with value “3” 
means that the education level is senior high-school; EDU with value “4” means that 
the education level is vocational training; EDU with value “5” means that the 
education level is college; EDU with value “6” means that the education level is 
graduate school. As study (Li, Rozelle, and Zhang, 2004) have suggested, a strong 
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relationship exists between the education level and the access to formal financing 
channels. Hence, we predict that the sign of the coefficient between EDU and UFM 
should be negative (the higher the number, the higher likelihood that the UFM is 1.) 
In China, it is usually the case that entrepreneurs with higher education levels seek 
funds from formal channels. Hence, we predict that the sign of the coefficient between 
EDU and UIFM should be positive. As for FDC, FDP, and FDN, we predict that 
entrepreneur with a high level of education will find it easier to access the funds from 
the formal financing channel. However, these elites may tap the informal funding 
markets to speculate. They borrow money from the informal markets, use it as 
collateral to get a loan from the banks (this works as leverage), and then lend it out in 
informal markets with a higher rate. Sometimes, the margin may be wide and almost 
risk-free when the informal financing market remains tranquil and stabilized. In 
Zhejiang Province, entrepreneurs having received higher education are likely to 
obtain funds; however, we cannot conclude that obtaining funds is related to a higher 
level of education. Hence, the variable EDU cannot be endogenous. 
 
BEX variable stands for the business experience of the respondent; the value is from 
question 9. The respondents answered this question with the year, and then we get the 
number by subtracting 2009 (e.g., if the answer is 2010, then the number of years of 
business experience is one year). According to financial growth-cycle theory, 
long-term business experience could bring entrepreneurs easier access to formal 
funding while early entrepreneurs may have to tap into the informal funding markets. 
Hence, we predict that a positive relationship exists between BEX and UFM while a 
negative relationship exists between BEX and UIFM. As for FDC, FDP, and FDN, we 
predict that sophisticated entrepreneurs will find it easier to access the funds from the 
formal financing channel. In Zhejiang Province, entrepreneurs with sophisticated 
business experience are likely to obtain funds while we cannot reach the conclusion 
that obtaining funds is related to sophisticated business experience. Hence, the 
variable AGE cannot be endogenous. 
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CRE variable stands for the credit rating status of the respondent; the value is from 
question 26. CRE with value “1” means that the respondent has received a credit 
rating while CRE with value “0” means the opposite. By definition, it is a 
dichotomous variable. It is highly likely that firms having received a credit rating may 
have already been approved for a loan application. Intuitively, these firms may not 
need to tap the informal funding market. Hence, a positive relationship exists between 
CRE and UFM while a negative relationship exists between CRE and UIFM. As for 
FDC, FDP, and FDN, we predict that firms with a credit rating will find it easier to 
access funds from the formal financing channel. In Zhejiang Province, firms that have 
received a credit rating are likely to obtain funds while we cannot conclude that 
obtaining funds is related to having received a credit rating. The common practice is 
that when firms have obtained funds from formal institutions like banks, banks have 
already conducted a credit rating on the firm. The firms may resort to other 
institutions for further funds or to diversify their financing channels. Other institutions 
might also assign them a rating. However, it must be clarified that the ratings assigned 
by other institutions are based on the extant financing practice, or in other words, the 
credit rating assigned by the finance providers. Hence, the variable CRE cannot be 
endogenous. 
 
SIZE stands for the turnover of the respondent; the value is from question 6. SIZE 
with value “1” means that the annual business turnover is less than 100,000 Chinese 
Yuan; SIZE with value “2” means that the annual business turnover is in the range 
100,000–999,999 Chinese Yuan; SIZE with value “3” means that the annual business 
turnover is in the range 1,000,000–9,999,999 Chinese Yuan; SIZE with value “4” 
means that the annual business turnover is more than 10,000,000 Chinese Yuan. 
Usually, firms with a large turnover have better access to the formal funding market 
while applications from small- and medium-sized firm are rejected. Hence, we predict 
that a negative relationship exists between SIZE and UFM while a positive 
relationship exists between SIZE and UIFM. As for FDC, FDP, and FDN, we predict 
that firms with a larger turnover will find it easier to access the funds from the formal 
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financing channel. In Zhejiang Province, firms of larger size are likely to obtain funds 
while we cannot conclude that obtaining funds is related to larger size. Hence, the 
variable SIZE cannot be endogenous. 
 
AGE stands for the age of the respondent; the value is from question 1. AGE with 
value “1” means that the respondent’s age is 0–20 years; AGE with value “2” means 
that the respondent’s age is 20–29 years; AGE with value “3” means that the 
respondent’s age is 30–39 years; AGE with value “4” means that the respondent’s age 
is 40–49 years; AGE with value “5” means that the respondent’s age is over 50 years. 
In Zhejiang Province, older entrepreneurs are likely to obtain funds while we cannot 
conclude that obtaining funds is related to the entrepreneurs being elder. Hence, the 
variable BEX cannot be endogenous. 
 
Based on the introduction of the dependent and independent variables, we conduct 
regression analysis of two types, binary regression and ordered regression. 
 
3.4 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, we present the descriptive statistics and 
conduct correlation analyses to roughly test the correlation among variables. 
 
In panel 1, we present the descriptive statistics for all the variables. 
 
We have five binary variables: NAT, CRE, and POL as independent variables and 
UFM and UIFM as dependent variables. The mean and median values show that they 
are all inclined to value 0, indicating that more people are not native, have not been 
credit rated, have no political connections, and have used neither the formal nor 
informal financing channels. Among them, POL has the lowest standard deviation. 
 
BEX is the only continuous variable. Its mean value is 6. The relatively low value 
shows that most of the respondents are not quite sophisticated in business experience. 
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The rest are all ordered variables. The respondents on average have received 
vocational training, were aged between 30 and 39, and had an annual turnover ranging 
from 1 to 10 million. Dependent variables FDP, FDC, and FDN share similar mean 
and median values, which shows that the feeling about financing constraints changes 
little over time. The higher mean and median values of FDC show that the financing 
crisis had some additional negative impact on respondents’ financing availability. 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
3
 
 
Panel 1: the descriptive statistics of all the variables 
  AGE BEX CRE EDU FDN FDC FDP NAT POL SIZE UFM UIFM 
 Mean 3.26  6.07  0.26  3.99  3.59  4.04  3.64  0.44  0.10  3.01  0.44  0.38  
 Median 3.00  5.00  0.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  0.00  0.00  3.00  0.00  0.00  
 Maximum 5.00  13.00  1.00  6.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  1.00  1.00  4.00  1.00  1.00  
 Minimum 1.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  
 Std. Dev. 1.19  3.34  0.44  1.48  1.09  1.03  0.97  0.50  0.30  0.95  0.50  0.49  
 Skewness 0.04  0.38  1.12  -0.42  -0.23  -0.72  -0.52  0.26  2.65  -0.59  0.26  0.51  
 Kurtosis 1.85  2.21  2.26  2.19  1.99  2.61  2.80  1.07  8.05  2.35  1.07  1.26  
 
Note: POL = political or bureaucratic connections of the respondents; NAT = whether 
the respondent is a native of Zhejiang Province; EDU = education level of the 
respondent; BEX = business experience of the respondent; CRE = credit rating status 
of the respondent; SIZE = turnover of the respondent; AGE = age of the respondent; 
UFM = respondent’s use of formal financing channels; UFIM = respondent’s use of 
informal financing channels; FDC = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining 
funds from formal financing channels during the recent international financial crisis; 
FDP = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from formal financing 
                                                        
3
 All of the empirical results in this project were obtained by using software SPSS version 13.0. 
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channels in the past; FDN = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from 
formal financing channels now. 
 
3.4.2 Correlation analysis 
3.4.2.1 Correlation between various independent variables 
In this section, we detect the existence of potential multicollinearity between the 
independent variables. The correlation matrix of all variables is presented in Table 
3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Correlation matrix of all variables 
 
 
EDU NAT BEX AGE CRE SIZE POL UFM UIFM FDP FDC FDN 
EDU 1.00  -0.12  -0.11  -0.37** 0.14  -0.09  -0.07  -0.61** 0.06  -0.08  -0.12  -0.10  
NAT   1.00   0.18* -0.11  0.02  -0.11  0.29** 0.05  0.01  0.15  0.01  0.11  
BEX     1.00  0.11  -0.06  0.11  -0.05  0.01  0.14  -0.17* -0.17* -0.06  
AGE       1.00  -0.26   0.43** -0.21  0.11  0.03  0.07  0.12  0.09  
CRE         1.00  -0.29** 0.01  0.02  0.08  -0.17* -0.23** -0.28** 
SIZE           1.00  -0.12  0.02  0.05  -0.01  0.17  0.08  
POL             1.00  0.11  0.06  0.45** 0.47** 0.32  
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
Note: POL = political or bureaucratic connections of the respondents; NAT = whether 
the respondent is a native of Zhejiang Province; EDU = the education level of the 
respondent; BEX = business experience of the respondent; CRE = credit rating status 
of the respondent; SIZE = turnover of the respondent; AGE = age of the respondent; 
UFM = respondent’s use of formal financing channels; UFIM = respondent’s use of 
informal financing channels; FDC = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining 
funds from formal financing channels during the recent international financial crisis; 
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FDP = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from formal financing 
channels in the past; FDN = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from 
formal financing channels now. 
 
Using a rule-of-thumb (Zhang, 2008), a correlation coefficient of more than 0.6 
suggests potential multicollinearity. As shown in Table 3.1, the correlation coefficients 
between each pair of independent variables are less than 0.6. Thus, there should not 
be any potential multicollinearity between the independent variables. Therefore, all of 
the independent variables discussed above could be included in the regression models. 
 
3.4.2.2 Correlation between independent variables and dependent variables 
In this part, we roughly explore the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables. The correlation matrix of independent variables is presented in 
Table 3.1. 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, the correlation coefficient between education and use of 
formal financing channels is more than 0.6, indicating that significant correlation 
exists between these two variables. However, no significant correlation is detected 
between any dependent variable and independent variable. 
 
3.4.2.3 Correlation between various dependent variables 
From Table 3.1, we also find that FDC, FDN, and FDP are highly correlated with 
each other, indicating that the feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from formal 
financing channels changed little with time. 
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3.5 Regression analysis 
3.5.1 Binary logistic regression analysis 
When the dependent variable is dichotomous, binary logistic regression should be 
used. Hence, binary regression analysis is used here for the variables UFM and UIFM. 
Table 3.2 and 3.3 show the regression results for the variables UFM and UIFM, 
respectively. 
 
From Table 3.2, we find that the regression model could reliably distinguish the 
respondents who chose the formal financing channels or not (the log-likelihood value 
is 130.87). A further look at the results tells us that the signs of the coefficients of the 
statistically significant independent variables, such as the education level and credit 
rating, are just as predicted. 
 
From Table 3.2, the odd ratios for the variables CRE, BEX, SIZE, and POL are 2.41, 
0.98, 0.96, and 2.1, respectively. In particular, the odds ratio indicates that the 
likelihood of obtaining funds from formal channels is 2.41 times higher for the 
respondents with closer political connections than those without. Similarly, the 
likelihood is 2.1 times higher for the respondents with a credit rating than those 
without. 
 
These results show that in our sample, hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 can be justified. 
Respondents with strong political connections are more inclined to use the formal 
financing channel than those without (consistent with Choi and Zhou, 2001). 
Entrepreneurs with a higher education level are more inclined to use more formal 
financing than those with a lower education level (consistent with Li, Rozelle, and 
Zhang, 2004). Firms having received a credit rating are more inclined to use more 
formal financing than those without (consistent with Padhi, and Woosley's (2004) 
findings in US cases). 
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However, the coefficient for the variables NAT and BEX is not statistically significant; 
the odds ratio for SIZE is also insignificant. In other words, hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 
cannot be justified. Here, we explain these inconsistencies. 
 
For the variable NAT, we argue that the nativeness may have an effect if urban and 
rural cooperatives are the major formal financing channels in the respondents’ 
jurisdiction. However, in our sample, there are only 12 cases for these two types of 
financial institution, and hence, the role of nativeness could not be brought fully into 
play. 
 
For the variable BEX, the results seem to be counter to what the theory claims. A 
probable reason is that Chinese entrepreneurs with long-term business experience may 
not have the advantage of being shielded against the power of economic cycle and 
firms’ own life-cycle. On one hand, the life-cycles of the private enterprises tend to be 
short in China. Even people with long-term business experience tend to be vulnerable 
when economic crisis occur. On the other hand, the legal framework in China is not 
sound enough to protect private property. People with long-term business experience 
may still have a strong memory about the era prior to the reform and opening-up 
period.  They may have other concerns when they resort to formal institutions for 
financing. 
 
Similar to the explanation given for the variable BEX, turnover may not directly lead 
to easier access to formal financing. In China, turnover is a plus for obtaining loans 
from financial institutions but it cannot ensure that banks would lend to a firm just 
based on their size. Firms belonging to encouraged industries, such as high-tech 
industries and the internet, may be able to get financing with their intellectual 
property rights as collateral despite being quite small in size. However, firms 
belonging to discouraged industries, such as iron and shipping, are prohibited from 
having access to funds no matter how big they are. 
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Table 3.2: The binary logistic regression results for the variable UFM. 
 
3.2.1 Model summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox and Snell 
R-Square 
Nagelkerke 
R-Square 
130.869 0.391 0.525 
 
3.2.2 Parameter estimation 
Variable  B S.E. Wald Sig. Odds ratio 
EDU 1.402 0.23 37.1 <0.001 0.246 
NAT -0.298 0.471 0.399 0.528 0.743 
BEX -0.017 0.071 0.055 0.815 0.984 
CRE 0.881 0.55 2.57 0.099 2.414 
SIZE 0.037 0.25 0.021 0.883 0.964 
POL 0.737 0.785 0.883 0.347 2.091 
Constant 3.68 1.049 12.297 <0.001 39.636 
 
Note: UFM = respondent’s use of formal financing channels; POL = political or 
bureaucratic connections of the respondents; NAT = whether the respondent is a native 
of Zhejiang Province; EDU = education level of the respondent; BEX = business 
experience of the respondent; CRE = credit rating status of the respondent; SIZE = 
turnover of the respondent's firm. 
 
Table 3.3: The binary logistic regression results for UIFM 
 
3.3.1 Model summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox and Snell 
R-Square 
Nagelkerke 
R-Square 
192.422 0.044 0.06 
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3.3.2 Parameter estimation 
Variable  B S.E. Wald Sig. Odds ratio 
EDU 0.099 0.118 0.699 0.403 1.104 
NAT -0.135 0.374 0.131 0.717 0.873 
BEX 0.106 0.056 3.643 0.056 1.112 
CRE 0.508 0.412 1.519 0.218 1.661 
SIZE 0.174 0.194 0.804 0.37 1.19 
POL 0.64 0.589 1.178 0.278 1.896 
Constant -2.138 0.792 7.295 0.007 0.118 
 
Note: UIFM = respondent’s use of informal financing channels; POL = political or 
bureaucratic connections of the respondents; NAT = whether the respondent is a native 
of Zhejiang Province; EDU = education level of the respondent; BEX = business 
experience of the respondent; CRE =credit rating status of the respondent; SIZE = 
turnover of the respondent's firm. 
 
As for the UIFM binary logistic regression model, few of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. The coefficient for BEX is statistically significant, with the 
sign unexpected. The coefficient is positive when we expect it to be negative. The 
odds ratio of variable BEX is also relatively low. Thus, no hypothesis proposed could 
be proved by this model. The implication is that people of different age, educational 
background, nativeness, and business experience might resort to the informal channels. 
This finding coincides with what we observe from daily life: the practice of informal 
financing in Zhejiang Province is universal and widespread. 
 
For the variable age, young entrepreneurs may have to tap into the informal funding 
market due to the fact that the firm is still in its infancy. However, it is also likely that 
the older entrepreneur may also go to the informal funding market for help when their 
firm faces temporary financial difficulties. For the variable education background, a 
probable reason for the unexpected sign may be that when the monetary policy 
tightens in China, firms may have no credit at all, and in this case, 
entrepreneurs—regardless of their education—may resort to the informal funding 
market. 
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For the variable nativeness, the result implies that the informal funding market does 
not distinguish the client based on their origin and so the entrepreneurs from different 
regions may all have the chance to employ the informal funding practices. For the 
variable business experience, the explanation for the unexpected sign is similar to that 
for the variable age. Early entrepreneurs may have to tap into the informal funding 
market due to the fact that the firm is still in its infancy; however, it is likely that the 
sophisticated entrepreneur may also go to the informal funding market for help when 
in financial difficulty. 
 
3.5.2 Ordered logistic regression analysis 
In this section, ordinal regression is adopted in which the dependent variable is an 
ordered one. The ordered logistic regression analysis is based on the assumption that 
the dependent variable can be ordered in terms of the degree of difficulty in obtaining 
funds from the formal financing channel. The results of these three regression 
equations reflect the probability that a given independent variable has an effect on 
each ordered degree of the dependent variable. Tables 3.4–3.6 show the regression 
results for the variables FDC, FDP, and FDN, respectively. Here, we analyze the 
results separately. 
 
From Table 3.4, we see that the coefficients of POL and CRE are statistically 
significant at the 1% threshold level while the coefficients of BEX and SIZE are 
statistically significant at the 5% threshold level. The coefficient of EDU and NAT are 
not statistically significant. The results show that during financial crises, political 
patronage, sophisticated business experience, larger turnover, and credit rating status 
can help the entrepreneur obtain funds. However, the effect of locality and level of 
education seem to be negligible. An explanation for these findings is as follows: when 
a crisis hits, formal institutions like commercial banks tend to be risk averse and 
unwilling to lend to SMEs that they are not familiar with. Political patronage, 
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sophisticated business experience, larger turnover, and credit rating status are 
effective indicators to ensure the banks that the firm is safe while indicators like 
locality and higher education are not effective in this regard. 
 
From Table 3.5, we see that the coefficients of POL and CRE are still statistically 
significant at the 1% threshold level and the coefficient of BEX is still statistically 
significant at the 5% threshold level. The coefficients of EDU, NAT, and SIZE are not 
statistically significant. These results show that political patronage, sophisticated 
business experience, and having a credit rating helped the firm obtain funds in the 
past. An explanation of these findings is as follows: unlike during the crisis period, 
during the relatively tranquil period (no credit rationing or credit control), immigrant 
entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs with a lower education level, as well as smaller firms, 
could all fetch the funds. 
 
From Table 3.6, we see that the coefficients of POL and CRE are statistically 
significant at the 1% threshold level. The coefficients of EDU, NAT, SIZE, and BEX 
are not statistically significant. These results show that political patronage and having 
received a credit rating help the firm to obtain funds now. However, business 
experience seems to be ineffective for the firm to successfully obtain funds from 
normal institutions. A probable reason for this result is that the second generation of 
the officials or successful businessman may enter into the business. They have strong 
political ties but no “sophisticated business experience” themselves. 
 
Combining these results, we see that political ties and having received a credit rating 
are quite robust in helping the entrepreneurs to obtain funds in different periods while 
other factors may only work at specified times. 
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Table 3.4: The ordered logistic regression results for FDC. 
 
Model fitting information 
Model 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Chi-Square Significance. 
Intercept only 373.484     
Final 313.617 59.687 <0.001 
 
Parameter estimation 
  a Estimate S.E. Wald Sig. 
Threshold 
FDC=1 -0.819 0.678 1.459 0.227 
FDC=2 0.586 0.676 0.751 0.386 
FDC=3 3.109 0.783 15.766 <0.001 
FDC=4 5.079 1.035 24.102 <0.001 
Location 
EDU -0.084 0.108 0.598 0.439 
NAT -0.394 0.347 1.291 0.256 
BEX -0.113 0.050 5.107 0.024 
CRE -1.124 0.414 7.361 0.007 
SIZE 0.436 0.177 6.058 0.014 
POL 3.685 0.653 31.811 <0.001 
 
Note: FDC = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from the formal 
financing channels during the recent international financial crisis; POL = political or 
bureaucratic connections of the respondents; NAT = whether the respondent is a native 
of Zhejiang Province; EDU = education level of the respondent; BEX = business 
experience of the respondent; CRE = credit rating status of the respondent; SIZE = 
turnover of the respondent's firm. 
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Table 3.5: The ordered logistic regression results for FDP. 
 
Model fitting information 
Model 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Chi-Square Sig. 
Intercept 
only 
390.151     
Final 344.414 45.737 <0.001 
 
Parameter estimation 
  a Estimate S.E. Wald Sig. 
Threshold 
FDP=1 -2.640 0.706 13.980 <0.001 
FDP=2 -0.305 0.665 0.211 0.646 
FDP=3 1.545 0.700 4.868 0.027 
FDP=4 3.955 0.928 18.165 <0.001 
Location 
EDU -0.049 0.105 0.218 0.641 
NAT 0.306 0.335 0.835 0.361 
BEX -0.115 0.049 5.556 0.018 
CRE -1.104 0.383 7.008 0.008 
SIZE 0.021 0.173 0.015 0.904 
POL 2.937 0.605 23.566 <0.001 
 
Note: FDP = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from the formal 
financing channels in the past; POL = political or bureaucratic connections of the 
respondents; NAT = whether the respondent is a native of Zhejiang Province; EDU = 
the education level of the respondent; BEX = business experience of the respondent; 
CRE = credit rating status of the respondent; SIZE = turnover of the respondent's firm. 
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Table 3.6: The ordered logistic regression results for FDN. 
 
Model fitting information 
Model 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Chi-Square Sig. 
Intercept Only 411.393     
Final 380.223 31.17 <0.001 
 
Parameter estimation 
  a Estimate S.E. Wald Sig. 
Threshold 
FDN=1 -1.579 0.660 5.713 0.017 
FDN=2 -0.056 0.645 0.008 0.931 
FDN=3 1.399 0.660 4.491 0.034 
FDN=4 4.437 0.962 21.280 <0.001 
Location 
EDU -0.043 0.102 0.177 0.674 
NAT 0.251 0.324 0.600 0.438 
BEX -0.048 0.047 1.060 0.303 
CRE -1.200 0.374 10.283 0.001 
SIZE 0.125 0.168 0.552 0.458 
POL 1.917 0.557 11.822 0.001 
 
Note: FDN = respondent’s feeling of difficulty in obtaining funds from the formal 
financing channels now; POL = political or bureaucratic connections of the 
respondents; NAT = whether the respondent is a native of Zhejiang Province; EDU = 
education level of the respondent; BEX = business experience of the respondent; CRE 
= credit rating status of the respondent; SIZE = turnover of the respondent's firm. 
 
A review of the explanatory variables reveals that these are actually good indicators of 
reputation and relationships in the informal financing literature. Political connections, 
nativeness, and education level can be used to measure the respondents' social 
relationships, and even reputation while credit rating could be seen as scale for 
creditworthiness, and business experience can also be considered as a measure of 
reputation. The empirical results show that these factors—especially political 
connection and credit rating status—have a significant impact on formal financing of 
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the small private firms. It could be concluded that relationship and reputation also 
play important roles in formal financing in China although they are conventionally 
labeled as the main characteristics of informal mechanisms. 
 
However, no significant factors could be found in regards to obtaining funds from 
informal channels. Irrespective of whether people had political connections, were 
local, had received higher or lower level of education, had sophisticated business 
experience, or had a credit rating, the respondents could all tap into the informal 
markets. Such a finding is crucial since the informal financing practice is universal 
and widespread. Pertinent micro-policies might not take effect and strategic 
macro-policies have to be made to ensure the stability of the whole financial system. 
 
It could be questioned why, if the formal financial system does not play an important 
role in supporting SMEs, are SMEs hurt most when the formal financial system is in 
trouble. This situation could be elaborated from the following aspects: 
1) The decisive factors for SMEs to develop and prosper are multifaceted. Both 
external and internal factors could exert vital impact. External factors include 
government factors, industry environment, market environment and regional 
environment; internal factors include enterprise resources, organizational structure, 
corporate culture, financing capacity, strategic management, innovative awareness 
and the quality of entrepreneurs. (Zhang, 2007; Chen, 2009). Financing is only one of 
the important factors. 
2) Although informal financing is one of the most important factors, it does not rule 
out the use of formal finance channels. Our investigation showed that 43% of 
respondents have used formal financing despite the difficulty in obtaining it. As we 
learnt from the interviews, the situation of SMEs’ formal financing has improved. 
3) Informal financing is rather complex, and we have learnt that part of the formal 
funding channel has flown to the informal market through various channels. This 
finding implies that the formal market and the informal market are intertwined. When 
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the formal market is tightened, the informal market will also be dampened, thus 
pushing the cost of funding up. 
4) The reason why the informal market could effectively fill the financing is that 
these funds can satisfy a higher return. When the economy slows down, the return 
from industry is lower and the funds will go elsewhere like speculative asset markets. 
Meanwhile, with the economy slowdown, internal funds also shrink, and thus SMEs 
will face financing pressure from both internal and external channels. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we gain further insight to SME financing in Zhejiang. From the 
empirical results, we find that firms with strong political ties, higher education, larger 
turnover, and having received a credit rating are more likely to employ formal 
financing practices. No consistent results are found for informal financing practices. 
Moreover, we find that more factors were important during the Global Financial 
Crisis while only political ties and credit rating status were important in the tightened 
monetary background of the period after 2010. Combining these results, we conclude 
that reputation and relationships are vital in obtaining funds from formal financing 
channels in China, while people tapping into informal financing do not show any 
dominant characteristics. This finding is critical because on one hand, the criteria 
necessary to obtain formal finance seem to be quite stringent while, on the other hand, 
almost any SME can obtain informal finance. In these circumstances, informal 
financing will inevitably play a dominant role within the financial system. In Chapter 
4, we will explore specific policy implications based on what we have observed in the 
previous two chapters and other findings. 
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Chapter 4 Policy suggestions on SME financing in Zhejiang 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we mainly focuses on studying the status quo of the SME financing in 
Zhejiang Province and exploring the role formal and informal financing play. With the 
data collected from the 150 valid copies of designed questionnaires, a brief 
understanding of these firms and their financing situation has been gained through 
basic descriptive statistics. In Chapter 3, we have gained further insight of SME 
financing in Zhejiang. From the empirical results conducted, we find that firms with 
strong political ties, higher education of managers, larger turnover and having 
received credit rating are more likely to employ formal financing practices. 
Meanwhile, we find that other factors only take effect in certain periods. Combining 
these results, we conclude that reputation and relationship is vital in obtaining funding 
from formal financing channels in China. As obtaining formal financing is difficult, 
this could give informal financing a role. Moreover, we find that practice of informal 
financing is universal and widespread. In Chapter 4, we firstly consult the extant 
literature to determine SME practice around the world, and then we interview five 
managers from a commercial bank to learn their mindset toward SME businesses. 
Through a combination of the literature and the interviews with the empirical results 
from the previous two chapters, we propose specific policy suggestions. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
SME financing could be seen as a system with the following parts: the SMEs who 
need the capital to survive, develop, and prosper; the formal and informal financial 
institutions who may (or may not) lend funds to SMEs; and the background that 
encourages or discourages the various financial institutions to lend to SMEs. In order 
to solve the SMEs' financing difficulties comprehensively, we propose the following: 
Step 1: Learn what good practices there are around the world 
Step 2: Learn the status quo of SME financing in Zhejiang Province comprehensively 
Step 3: Propose advice accordingly to meet the gap between steps 1 and 2 
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The second step has been done in the previous two chapters while in this chapter, we 
address the remaining two steps. 
 
In this section, the extant literature concerning SME financing is consulted from three 
dimensions: the providers of funds to SMEs—the supply side; the SMEs—the 
demand side; and the background. The literature is mainly compiled according to the 
authors’ (of the literatures) advice or conclusions. 
 
4.2.1 The providers of funds to SMEs—The supply side 
In this section, we introduce the literature regarding the fund suppliers for SMEs, the 
various financial institutions. Specifically, we focus on the following four dimensions: 
the characteristics of banks, banks’ internal decision-making, banks’ products and 
service to SMEs, and the role of guarantee societies. 
 
4.2.1.1 The characteristics of banks—Size and ownership 
Ahunov Muzaffa, Van, and Jegers (2011) investigated foreign banks’ interest in 
financing small- and medium-sized enterprises in Ukraine, a country where massive 
foreign bank entry took place during a late stage of transition. The study uses unique, 
self-collected bank-level data on banks' involvement with SMEs in the years 2004, 
2006, 2009, and 2010. Initially, foreign banks were neither less nor more interested in 
financing SMEs than domestic banks. However, with the surge in the presence of 
foreign bank in the years 2005–2006, acquired foreign banks started demonstrating a 
higher involvement with SMEs relative to not only domestic banks, but also to 
green-field foreign banks. The mode of entry of foreign banks thus clearly matters, 
and so does their country of origin: acquired banks from long-standing market 
economies are more inclined to offer SME-specific products in general, whereas their 
counterparts from post-socialist countries are more likely to provide loans to SMEs 
and run SME promotion activities. Overall, the findings are consistent with the recent 
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literature that challenges the conventional wisdom that foreign banks are not 
interested in lending to SMEs. 
 
Using unique panel data constructed from the Ecological Environment Survey 
conducted in 2005, Shen, Shen, Xu, and Bai (2009) evaluate how bank size affects 
SME lending. They find that measured by total asset, bank size is an insignificant 
factor for SME lending. On the other hand, if banks are defined with a more 
hierarchical level as big and rural credit cooperatives as being small, the data provide 
evidence that smaller banks can lend more funds to SMEs. This should not discourage 
the establishment of small- and medium-sized banks even though total bank assets are 
not a significant factor. In fact, more small- and medium-sized banks can lead to 
greater SME lending by generating more intense competition in local markets. 
 
4.2.1.2 Bank’s internal decision-making 
Kooli (2011) argues that deregulation and progress in information and communication 
technologies have increased the geographical expansion of banking structures and 
instruments. The trend implies that banks are operationally closer to the borrowers. 
Meanwhile, consolidation in the banking industry has induced a geographical 
concentration of decision-centers and strategic functions, leading to an increase in the 
functional distance that separates the decision center of a bank from its operational 
branches (Kooli, 2011). Kooli evaluates the impact of these two trends on SME 
lending and the empirical findings suggest that: 
1) Increased functional distance induces an increase in the investment cash flow 
sensitivity, which is considered as a measure of financing constraints. 
2) The relationship between operational proximity and financing constraints is 
nonlinear with an investment–cash flow relationship that is increasing for low levels 
of operational proximity below a certain threshold and decreasing for high levels of 
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operational proximity. The adverse effect of functional distance on financing 
constraints is particularly acute for small firms. (Kooli, 2011) 
 
With the empirical findings, two policy-oriented implications have been proposed by 
Kooli: 
1) Increase in the functional distance led by the consolidation of the French banking 
industry may aggravate financing problems of small local firms, especially in 
peripheral departments. As Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2009) and Berger 
and Udell (2002) have pointed out, these negative externalities of market deregulation 
could be reduced by favoring a change in emphasis in bank organization from the 
search of economies of scale by standardized, arm’s-length lending technologies, to 
economies of scope by making specialized credit instruments available to local firms. 
2) Their findings regarding operational proximity and its impact on SME financing 
suggest that the French banking system should be more operationally proximate to 
local firms to better fit their funding needs and to promote the entry and creation of 
new banks and non-bank competitors struggling to offer financing to local firms. 
Despite commendable efforts made by certain banking groups since the early 2000s to 
reinforce the French banking system’s supply by opening new branches, much 
remains to be done in this field.(Kooli, 2011) 
 
De la Torre, Soledad, Peria, and Schmukler (2008) studied the factors that banks 
perceive as drivers and obstacles to financing SMEs. De la Torre et al. focused on the 
role of competition and the institutional framework. They used a survey of banks in 
Argentina and Chile and showed that, despite alleged differences in the countries’ 
environments regarding rules, regulations, and ease of doing business, SMEs have 
become a strategic segment for most banks in both countries. In particular, banks have 
begun to target SMEs due to the significant competition in the corporate and retail 
sectors. They perceive the SME market as highly profitable, large, and with good 
prospects. Moreover, banks are developing coping mechanisms to overcome the 
particular institutional obstacles present in each country and to compete for SMEs. 
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Banks’ interest in SMEs is not based on government programs, yet policy action 
might help reduce the cost of providing financing, especially long-term lending. (De 
la Torre, Soledad, Peria, and Schmukler, 2008) 
 
Shen, Shen, Xu, and Bai (2009) used unique panel data constructed from the 
Ecological Environment Survey (conducted in 2005) and show the effect of lending 
authority (self-loan approval rights), incentives of loan officers (profit weights in 
performance evaluation, and the payment scheme), bank competition, and institutional 
arrangements on SME lending. Shen et al. find that lending to SMEs would be higher 
if an institution has been authorized with more self-loan approval right, competition is 
fiercer, and if the loan manager’s wage is linked with loan quality. From the 
institutional point of view, they find that weak law enforcement would lead to less 
SME lending. Their dataset also indicates that in most cases, soft information is an 
important consideration when banks make decisions about SME loans, only if wages 
are linked with loan quality and cost control measures are undertaken. The literature 
supporting the concept that small banks tend to provide greater SME lending narrates 
the story that if a bank is small, then the bank can collect more soft information; 
SMEs are at a comparative advantage in providing soft information, and thus small- 
and medium-sized banks are more willing to lend to SMEs. Their study therefore 
indicates that in China, even if a bank has the advantage of collecting soft information, 
whether it has an incentive to fully utilize such information is critical for the success 
of the above story. If a local bank has higher self-loan approval rights, if the upper 
branch provides greater pressure in making profit through increasing the weight of 
profit in performance evaluation, and if wages are linked with loan quality and cost 
control measures are undertaken, then the local bank tends to work hard on collecting 
and using soft information to find high-quality customers. The above discussion 
indicates that it is necessary to be granted the authority to control its funds, and 
incentive schemes for loan managers need to be worked out carefully so that small 
and medium sized bank can grow in a sustainable fashion. In the process, the 
government can still play an active role, not through directly interfering in loan 
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decisions but through fostering a good institutional environment such as stronger law 
enforcement. (Shen, Shen, Xu, and Bai, 2009) 
4.2.1.3 Banks' products and services to SMEs 
Rahman and Khatun (2012) ascertained the underlying factors that influence the 
financing of SMEs from formal channels in Bangladesh. A survey was carried out 
among the SME entrepreneurs in order to identify the presence and importance of 
both the finance-related and service-related factors. The results of the principal 
component analysis identified five factors: 
1) Service delivery factors—four factors are retrieved due to their relationship with 
this factor, including: 
 Convenient locations of financial institutions 
 Quality of service of financial institution’s staff 
 Availability of other financial services from the same provider 
 Similarity and correctness of information 
2) Service responsiveness factor—four factors are retrieved due to their relationship 
with this factor, including: 
 Spontaneity of loan delivery (time, amount) 
 Need special connections with banks 
 Processing and consulting fee 
 An effective secured transactions system 
3) Fund availability factor—two factors are retrieved due to their relationship with 
this factor, including: 
 Cheaper than other source of financing 
 Scope for future fund availability 
4) Fund delivery factor—three factors are retrieved due to their relationwith this 
factor, including: 
 Interest rate 
 Repayment process 
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 Relaxation of collateral requirements 
5) Implicit cost factor—two factors are retrieved due to their relationship with this 
factor, including: 
 Low direct and indirect cost 
 Bank paperwork or bureaucracy 
Among these five principal factors identified, service delivery factor has been found 
to be the most significant factor with the highest variance. The empirical results have 
several implications for the financial institutions as the formal sources of funds for the 
SME. The providers of funds can concentrate on several strategic issues to deal with 
the aspects of SME financing. The first issue is to reduce or eliminate implicit costs 
that SMEs might incur in the process of collecting required funds. This would assist 
the fund-providing organizations (e.g., banks) to ensure the easy access to capital for 
the SME, which would further enhance the quality of the service-delivery process 
since it would reduce needless bureaucratic stages of the fund disbursement. Another 
key issue is that the study would help the fund-providing organizations to bring 
simplicity in their loan collection and repayment processes if they can ensure relaxed 
collateral requirements as well as easy repayment processes. Still, one broad strategic 
benefit of the study for the fund providers would be the development and alignment of 
the service-delivery and responsiveness issues within the fund-providing 
organizations (such as banks). This means that the fund providers from the formal 
channels need to consider service aspects of the loans and advances in addition to the 
core fund-related issues (such as availability). The quality of the SME financing can 
be improved further if the formal channel members commit themselves to ensure 
these broad issues while extending loan facilities to the SME entrepreneurs.( Rahman 
and Khatun, 2012) 
 
Liu (2009) studies the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on small and medium 
enterprises in mainland China. The author states that comprehensive policy 
suggestions have been proposed from various dimensions including the most 
important formal financial institutions. Banks should be given incentives to lend to 
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SMEs first, then innovative products should be developed to serve and the ideology 
towards SMEs should be transformed accordingly. 
 
Commercial banks can make use of financial product innovation based on mortgage 
guarantees to help SMEs obtain bank loans (Li, 2001). Proceeding from the scope of 
the entire industrial chain, banks can issue credit based on the comprehensive 
business chain and effectively inject funds into relevant enterprises according to the 
business’s transactional relationships. This can enable banks to provide flexible 
financial products and services. In terms of modalities for financing the supply chain, 
the strength of creditability of core large enterprises can be utilized to help SMEs 
obtain financing from banks. It would lower bank exposure to loan risks to some 
extent.(Liu, 2009) 
 
Liu (2009) also argued that Commercial banks should improve services for SMEs. 
First of all, the banks should have a department dedicated to the management of 
financing services for SMEs in light of SMEs’ unique characteristics. Center of 
operation for SME credit business should be set up with dedicated client managers to 
serve SME clients. Secondly, banks should streamline the approval procedure; for 
example, the establishment of SMEs loan relationships, credit ratings, credit approval, 
and mortgage pricing could be combined into one service. The efficiency of loan 
approval could then be enhanced.  
 
4.2.1.4 The role of guarantee societies 
Cabrero, Sánchez, and Molinero (2013) analyze how Spanish Reciprocal Guarantee 
Societies (RGSs) have developed and the problems they face resulting from an 
increase in bad debts in the 2008 global economic crisis. Facing current difficulties, 
the RGS have become all the more significant as they facilitate credit access for 
SMEs. However, as other financial institutions, these societies are also affected by the 
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increase in bad debts and they also need to keep required solvency ratios. Cabrero et 
al. analyze the role of re-warranty packages for covering the credit risk of RGS, the 
solvency of these societies and their level of activity over these years. It is clear that 
the latest introduced mechanisms have been important. Practical examples include: 
taking into account Spanish Re-warranty Company, S.A. (CERSA) re-warranty when 
calculating the capital compliance ratio and the introduction of different autonomous 
re-financing models. These measures allow the RGSs to assume greater risk and 
reinforce their solvency. (Cabrero, Sánchez, and Molinero, 2013) 
 
In summary, we can conclude that banks’ characteristics like size and ownership seem 
not to be significant factors. However, internal decision-making carries much weight, 
as it directly affects the products and services banks provide to its clients, inlcuding 
SMEs. Therefore, more policy suggestions should be proposed in this regard. 
Moreover, the practice of guarantee societies in Spain implies the possibility of setting 
up similar institutions in China. 
 
4.2.2 The SMEs—The demand side 
In this section, we focus on the SMEs themselves, that is, the demand side of the 
funding. Specifically, we discuss the following three dimensions: firm financing 
demand, firm financing channel selection, and corporate governance. 
 
4.2.2.1 Firms' financing demand 
Hertland and Mjłs (2012) show that investments of ex ante financially unconstrained 
firms are more affected by exogenous changes in credit availability than investments 
of financially constrained firms. Using a survey of Norwegian, primarily non-listed, 
firms with questions about how they were affected by the financial crisis of 2008–
2009, they combine the answers to these survey questions with information about the 
firms’ financial and bank accounts. They investigate whether changes in credit 
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availability affect investment after controlling for firm output demand. They find that 
this is the case, even though the effect of changes in credit availability is substantially 
reduced when including firm output demand control variables. In their second 
research question, they find that changes in credit availability affect investments the 
most for the least financially constrained firms. A potential reason for this is that the 
unconstrained firms have the easiest access before the crisis, and are therefore likely 
to experience the largest changes in a situation where banks reduce access to credit for 
all firms. They present a basic theory model to illustrate the mechanism behind this. 
The findings suggest that purely looking at the correlation between credit availability 
and firm investments of the most financially constrained firms during economic 
downturns is unlikely to capture the full dynamics of the credit channel on the 
business cycle. Financially constrained firms’ tendency to use cash holdings and other 
means to hedge against future cash flow shortfalls, and potentially also against future 
credit market disruptions, means that the dynamics of financial constraints and their 
effects on real investments are more complex than has generally been assumed in the 
prior literature. (Hertland and Mjłs, 2012) 
4.2.2.2 Firms' financing channel selection 
Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández and Udell (2013) argue that firms, SMEs in 
particular, suffered from a significant credit crunch during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Due to a lack of data in the US and elsewhere, little research exists on how SMEs 
coped with this problem. Carbó-Valverde et al. analyze for the first time whether 
trade credit provided an alternative source of external finance to SMEs during the 
crisis. Using firm-level Spanish data, they find that credit constrained SMEs depend 
on trade credit, but not bank loans, and that the intensity of this dependence increased 
during the financial crisis. Unconstrained firms, in contrast, are dependent on bank 
loans not trade credit. (Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández and Udell, 2013) 
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4.2.2.3 Corporate governance and self-construction 
According to the definition of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Corporate Governance Committee, corporate governance is a 
system by which corporations are directed and controlled. In addition, corporate 
governance is defined as relationships among the top management, board of directors, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. In this regard, corporate governance is a 
structure that determines objectives of corporations and performance evaluation 
methods to reach these objectives. (Tunal, 2009). 
 
There are two main corporate governance models in the world. These models are 
stockholder governance and stakeholder governance (Prabhaker, 1998; Wheeler and 
Sillanpää, 1998; Gamble and Kelly, 2001; Vinten, 2001; Friedman and Miles, 2002; 
Letza, Sun, and Kirkbride, 2004). The stockholder governance model emphasizes the 
importance of shareholders in the governance of corporations. On the other hand, all 
stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, society in general, 
government, financial institutions, etc.) are equally important in the stakeholder 
governance model (Günay, 2008). In today's business world, the stakeholder 
governance model is more rational than the stockholder governance model because of 
complex network of relationships among corporate stakeholders. (Günay, 2008). 
 
Traditionally, it is thought that corporate governance is related to large-sized 
companies and agency problems. Agency problem arises as the result of the 
relationships between shareholders and managers. It may be thought that there is no 
need for corporate governance in SMEs because the owner and manager is the same 
person and agency problem is irrelevant in these firms. Besides, it may be thought that 
there is no need for accountability for the firms that do not use external funds. 
However, a firm needs its stakeholders for its existence and growth. In other words, it 
does not mean that there is no need for corporate governance if the owner and 
manager is the same person and a firm does not use any external funds (Abor and 
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Adjasi, 2007). In this regard, it is important that SMEs form good relationships with 
their customers, suppliers, employees, and society in general. 
 
Abor and Adjasi (2007) examined the impact of corporate governance in SMEs in 
Gana and argued that having independent board members brings forth a new strategic 
aspect and increase firms’ competitiveness. Independent board members help firms 
have creativity and innovation and achieve fast growth. In this regard, it is reported in 
a study conducted in Japan that SMEs with high growth rates have more independent 
board members compared to large-sized firms (Liang and Meng, 2010). Having a 
board without independent board members in SMEs makes it ineffective in terms of 
monitoring daily operations of management (Huse, 2000; Brunninge and Nordqvist, 
2004). On the other hand, the existence of independent board members allows boards 
to be used as strategy development instruments (Fiegener, 2005). Therefore, 
independent board members play an important role in the strategic growth of SMEs. 
 
Ramakrishnan (2013) argue that good governance is vital for the development of a 
healthy and competitive corporate sector. For SMEs, corporate governance is about 
the respective roles of the shareholders as owners and the managers. It is about 
establishing rules and procedures to manage and run the enterprise. It has been 
empirically tested that good governance practices of a company gives a positive signal 
to investors. With the globalization of markets, international capital flows have 
become extremely valuable sources of external financing. Good corporate governance 
leads to the development of a framework that provides adequate protection to the 
interests of stakeholders and reinforces the fiduciary responsibilities of those vested 
with the authority to act on behalf of the stakeholders. ( Ramakrishnan, 2013) 
 
Mahzan and Yan (2013) argues that it is imperative for SME to strengthen its 
governance, risk, and control (GRC) system that is recommended by Corporate 
Governance (CG) code to support strong business performance. The internal auditor is 
the right party to provide assurance and consultancy on GRC for a firm to stay 
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competitive. There is generally a lack of awareness among these enterprises regarding 
significance of internal audit and if there is awareness and there is a general aversion 
to adopting these practices because of the cost of implementation. Their paper is 
carried out solely through analysis of the extant literature. Mahzan and Yan identify 
from reports and previous studies that SME failures are due to several factors 
including low productivity and lack of financing, as well as inadequate skills and 
capabilities. The corporate governance literature posits that companies may achieve 
strategic, tactical, and operational efficiency by embracing good CG principles, which 
include risk management and control mechanisms. Further, internal audit enhances 
CG through assurance and consultancy work on GRC. Based on the findings from the 
review of the extant literature, the current status of CG in SMEs is not impressive at 
all, mainly because of lack of awareness, as well as the high cost of implementation 
involved. However, good governance is still deemed important, and hence, the authors 
may argue that a separate set of corporate governance frameworks may work better 
for SMEs, similar to the adoption of a separate set of International Financial 
Reporting Standards( IFRS) for SMEs. (Mahzan and Yan, 2013) 
 
Liu (2009) studied the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in mainland China. The author advised that SMEs’ ability 
for self-construction should be strengthened as well. This can be done in the following 
four ways: 
• Strengthening capability in technological innovation 
• Strengthening financial management, improving financial systems, and enhancing 
credit rating 
• Building brand awareness to enhance competitiveness. The Global Financial Crisis 
is a good opportunity for corporate upgrading. SMEs must be responsive to updating 
products, developing new products, and building their own brands on an active and 
constant basis 
• Boosting the construction of SME credit systems for further market development 
(Liu, 2009) 
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Although corporate governance has many advantages for the SMEs, there are also 
costs. For instance, having an external audit and independent board members are 
costly, especially for SMEs. Advantages of corporate governance are received in the 
middle term while costs are assumed in the short term. This cost makes the 
implementation of corporate governance principles difficult for SMEs. Calculating the 
dollar cost of corporate governance is difficult for firms of all sizes (Chittenden, 
Kauser, and Poutziouris, 2002). Clarke and Klettner (2009) examined corporate 
governance applications of 19 SMEs quoted in the Australian stock market. They 
argue in their study that implementation of corporate governance principles have a 
significant dollar-cost for firms of all sizes. Furthermore, they argue that there is 25% 
more time-cost for the large-sized firms. For SMEs, the time-cost is even more than 
25%, and hence, utility-cost analyses must be made by SMEs to implement corporate 
governance principles in their firms. 
 
In summary, we find that self-construction, such as enhancing corporate governance, 
is also important according to the global practice. 
 
4.2.3 Infrastructure for SMEs to obtain financing 
In this section, we introduce the background that encourages or discourages the 
various financial institutions to lend to SMEs. Specifically, we focus on the following 
three dimensions: taking advantage of capital markets, macro-policy encouraging 
banks to lend to SMEs, and banking industry supervision and competition. 
 
4.2.3.1 Taking advantage of capital markets 
Jafarov (2013) proposes policy suggestions to engage in promoting SME development 
in Azerbaijan with reference to infrastructure building: 
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Credit Registration: Coordinate dissemination of financial literacy assistance 
programs. Instead of a centralized registry, several credit bureaus could be licensed to 
operate under commercial incentives, compete with each other devoted specifically to 
small and medium enterprises, for extensive and accurate information, and ultimately 
be regulated by a designated authority. Countries with heavy SME presence, 
underscoring the quality of business relationship and mutual trust, went further and 
established even credit bureaus. 
Loan or bond issuance: To catalyze financing for start-up SMEs that are too small to 
issue debt, secure a loan or otherwise be accommodated by traditional financial 
intermediaries, developing support vehicles for tailor-made venture capital or private 
equity funds may be considered among the long-term objectives. 
Securitization mechanisms: To mitigate the adverse impact of mismatch in bond 
issuance, devising various securitization mechanisms has also been affirmed to be a 
particularly powerful technique in underdeveloped markets. Conceptually, 
securitization means repackaging regular and classifiable cash flows from a 
diversified portfolio of illiquid present or future receivables of varying maturity and 
quality into negotiable capital market paper (“tranches”) issued by either the 
originator of the securitized assets/receivables or a non-recourse, single-asset finance 
company (“special-purpose vehicle,” Park, 2008). Debt issuance by SMEs with low 
credit ratings can also be collectively repackaged by special-purpose vehicles with 
solid creditworthiness and sold to the investors with diverse risk preferences. 
Individual SME bonds are perceived to be risky, but pooling them altogether 
significantly reduces the overall risk of default. Related to this, the primary 
collateralized bond obligations (P-CBOs) used in Korea are an example of such a 
mechanism. Following the Asian Financial Crisis, the Korean government launched a 
P-CBO program in order to diversify financing options for failing SMEs and reduce 
their dependence on bank loans. The P-CBO is an asset-backed security issued by the 
special-purpose vehicles, usually bankruptcy remote corporations, trusts, partnerships, 
or limited liability companies, with bonds issued by many SMEs as an underlying 
security. Credit enhancement is also provided through banks and credit guarantee 
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funds, while their quality is assessed via local credit-rating agencies. The basic 
structure of P-CBO issuance is provided below: 
Figure 4.1 Structure of P-CBO mechanism: 
 
Source: Developing the Capital Market to Widen and Diversify SMEs Financing: The 
Korean Experience, 2008 
 
Liu (2009) argues that SMEs must receive assistance to make them more credit ready. 
A multi-faceted approach must be employed, training SMEs to cover marketing, 
product development, efficiency, etc. This will positively impact their growth and 
development. Financing channels for SMEs through the capital market must also be 
developed. It is necessary to expand the scale of the SME board at the Shenzhen 
Securities Exchange, accelerate and boost the Growth Enterprise Market, improve the 
fostering mechanism for the listing of SMEs, and encourage various business start-up 
institutions to strengthen investment for SMEs, especially innovative SMEs. It is 
important to encourage local governments to issue collective bonds to SMEs so as to 
effectively expand their direct financing channels. The SMEs Development Fund and 
the SMEs Innovation and Investment Fund must also be established. 
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4.2.3.2 Macro-policy encouraging banks to lend to SMEs 
In a Joint Survey of the Union of Arab Bank and the World Bank, Rocha, Farazi, 
Khouri, and Pearce (2011) study the status of bank lending to SMEs in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region. Among the principal constraints for SME 
lending is the lack of SME transparency, poor credit information from credit registries 
and bureaus, and weak creditor rights. If constraints can be addressed, lending can 
potentially reach bank targets of 21%. State banks still play an important role in 
financing SMEs in the MENA region, but they use less sophisticated 
risk-management systems than private banks. On the other hand, credit guarantee 
schemes are a popular form of support to SME finance in the region, and are 
associated with higher levels of SME lending. The paper concluded that MENA 
policy-makers should prioritize improvements in financial infrastructure, including 
greater coverage and depth of credit bureaus, improvements in the collateral regime 
(especially for movable assets), and increased competition between banks and also 
non-banks. Weaknesses in insolvency regimes and credit-reporting systems should 
also be alleviated. Direct policy interventions through public banks, guarantee 
schemes, lower reserve requirements, and subsidized lending, as well as other 
measures, have played a role in compensating for MENA’s weak financial 
infrastructure, but more sustainable structural solutions are needed.( Rocha, Farazi, 
Khouri, and Pearce , 2011) 
 
Liu (2009) studied the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on small and medium 
enterprises in mainland China and advises that the government must also initiate 
capacity-building support services for both banks and the SME sector. Banks must be 
capacitated to lend not merely on the basis of collateral, but rather, on the basis of 
SME risk using several indicators. 
 
For the main formal funding providers, the commercial banks should be mandated to 
lend to the SMEs or be provided with good incentives to lend to SMEs willingly. 
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Then, hopefully, the bank loans to SMEs could reach a higher target. In this light, 
financial institution (especially banks) issuing loans to SMEs could be exempted from 
business tax. Relevant organizations and individuals transferring or leasing patents to 
SMEs can also be exempted from, or have a deduction of, business taxes (Gao, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, Liu (2009) argues that a benign business environment is usually a key 
determinant for the development of SMEs. Evaluation of this environment includes 
barriers to entry and exit, property rights protection, contract enforcement, and the 
functioning of the public service system. 
 
Credit-guarantee schemes have been one of the most important policy tools in many 
countries. According to Green (2003), Today over 2,250 schemes exist in almost 100 
countries. An economic rationale for such public intervention is that it can enhance 
efficiency by providing additional funds for SMEs that are in fact healthy but unable 
to borrow sufficient loans because of the informational gap between lenders and 
borrowers. 
 
Extant empirical studies provide evidence that could justify such intervention. Riding 
and Haines Jr. (2001) and Riding, Madill, and Haines (2007) analyzed data from 
Canada and observed that a credit-guarantee program enhanced SMEs’ loan 
availability. In the UK, Cowling (2010) shows that the loan-guarantee program 
alleviated credit constraints of small firms by promoting access to debt finance. Using 
a firm-level panel data from Italy for the period 1999–2004, Zecchini and Ventura 
(2009) demonstrate that credit guarantees reduced the cost of finance by 16–20% and 
the median value of total debt increased 9.64%. Using a dataset from Japan during the 
financial crisis in the late 1990s, Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro (2010) also find that 
the special credit-guarantee program improved credit availability for small businesses. 
 
Using a micro-dataset, Kang and Heshmati (2008) and Oh, Lee, Heshmati, and Choi 
(2009) find that the Korean credit guarantee program initiated after the Asian currency 
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crisis had a significantly positive impact on employment, sales, and wages, although it 
had no significant impact on productivity and investment. In the US, Hancock, Peek, 
and Wilcox (2007) used state-level data for 1990–2000 and observed that 
disbursements of bank loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
are associated not only with more output, employment, and dollar payrolls, but also 
with fewer business failures and bankruptcies. Craig, Craig, Jackson, and Thomson 
(2007) also find a positive correlation between the relative levels of SBA-guaranteed 
bank loans in a local market and the future per capita income growth. Using data of 
the emergency credit-guarantee program during the Lehman shock episode in Japan, 
Ono, Uesugi, and Yasuda (2013) demonstrate that the program eased credit 
availability, but the ex-post performance of small businesses after receiving credit 
guarantee deteriorated compared with those not receiving such guarantees. 
 
The effectiveness of credit-guarantee schemes has been fully evaluated, while its cost 
has been scarcely studied. One important source of the cost of providing credit 
guarantee is adverse selection and moral hazard. Since credit guarantee insures banks 
from incurring losses from default, banks are enticed to ask seemingly risky 
borrowers to apply for credit guarantee. Due to the fact that credit-guarantee 
corporations cannot distinguish low-risk borrowers from risky ones, credit-guarantee 
schemes attract a sizable portion of risky borrowers, which results in inefficient 
resource allocation. Kuniyoshi and Daisuke (2014) argued that this potential problem 
could be especially grim in Japan where the proportion of 100% credit guarantee is 
more than 50%. They used data on city, regional, and shinkin
4
 banks and their 
findings are consistent with the adverse selection and moral hazard predicament. They 
found statistically significant positive correlations between credit risk (subrogation 
rate) and the amount of guaranteed loans, indicating that a public credit-guarantee 
program is influenced by asymmetric information. Further investigation also 
                                                        
4
 Shinkin banks are cooperative regional financial institutions for SMEs. See the website of 
Shinkin Central Bank for details about shinkin banks: 
http://www.shinkin-central-bank.jp/index_fin_e.html. 
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suggested that the association between the subrogation rate and the ratio of guaranteed 
loans to total loan is stronger for 100% credit guarantee than for 80% credit 
guarantees, implying that the “20% self-payment” criteria is working as an effective 
mechanism for alleviating the problem, but is not enough to eliminate it. 
 
4.2.3.3 Banking industry supervision and competition 
Agostino and Trivieri (2008) investigated whether local differences in banking 
competition impact on the amount of bank debt used by Italian small- and 
medium-sized manufacturing firms. Sample selection and Double Hurdle models are 
adopted as the process, which results in the choice of bank financing may differ from 
that determining its amount. Their main finding is that more competitive banking 
markets seem to be associated with relatively higher usage of bank debt by less 
transparent firms. On the other hand, a higher banking competition seems to have no 
effect on the probability of receiving bank loans. (Agostino and Trivieri, 2008) 
 
Using a survey on the financing of enterprises in China, combined with detailed bank 
branch information, Chong and Lu (2012) investigated how concentration in the local 
banking market affects the availability of credit. They find that a lower market 
concentration alleviates financing constraints. The widespread presence of joint-stock 
banks has a larger effect on alleviating these constraints than the presence of city 
commercial banks, while the presence of state-owned banks has a smaller effect. 
 
Ryan, Conor, and Fergal (2014) investigate the impact of bank market power on 
investment financing constraints experienced by SMEs. By using a large sample of 
approximately 118,000 SMEs across 20 European countries over the period 2005–
2008, their sample extends the coverage of both countries and firms relative to 
existing research. Ryan et al test the degree to which firms are financially constrained 
and investigate how such financial constraints vary by the degree of market 
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competition between domestic banks. They also explore whether this relationship is 
heterogeneous across firm size categories. (Ryan, Conor, and Fergal, 2014) 
 
Ryan et al. find that firms’ investment is sensitive to the availability of internal funds 
and interpret this as being indicative of a wedge between the cost of internal and 
external financing. Furthermore, they find that market power of a bank is associated 
with lower levels of SME investment. Moreover, the adverse impact of bank market 
power on investment is driven by the adverse effect of market power on financing 
constraints. In fact, much of the variation in cash-investment sensitivity is captured by 
the bank’s market power effect. Separately, they estimate the empirical model to test 
for heterogeneous effects of bank market power on financing constraints across 
different categories of firm size. They find that the adverse effect of bank market 
power on financing constraints is reduced for the smallest subset of firms—defined as 
“microenterprises”—and argue that this is evidence of an information hypothesis-type 
effect that dampens, but is ultimately outweighed by, the direct market power effect. 
(Ryan, Conor, and Fergal, 2014) 
 
The research of Ryan, Conor, and Fergal (2014) provides a number of important 
insights for SME credit policy in the context of Europe’s economic recovery and 
financial stability. In many cases, the very heterogeneous impact of the financial crisis 
on domestic banking sectors in Europe has led to a retrenchment towards domestic 
activity (Barrell Fie, Fitz, Orazgani and Whitworth, 2011). It is a result of the 
extensive, but necessary, state intervention to provide banking sector support and 
restructuring (Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009). Ryan et al.’s findings suggest that SMEs 
will face increasing financing constraints if such restructuring significantly lessens 
competition between financial institutions. Such credit constraints would inevitably 
lead to lower investment and potential output, if binding in the medium term. Policy 
actions that ensure financial stability but provide for additional (or just restore) 
competition in the European lending market for SMEs would be a necessary condition 
for future SME growth and it would support economic development. Additionally, as 
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they find that the effect of bank market power on financing constraints is stronger in 
financial systems that are more bank-dependent, the implication is that developing 
more alternative liquid financing sources for SMEs in Europe would be helpful to 
create a more stable financing environment. This would provide firms with a number 
of financing channels and the possibility of following a more diversified financial 
structure. (Ryan, Conor, and Fergal, 2014) 
 
In summary, various measures have been applied to the SMEs financing environment 
such as taking good advantage of capital markets, adopting more favorite policies for 
banks to lend to SMEs, etc. We may wonder whether these policies could possibly fit 
the context in China. In order to find out, in the next section, we  determine the 
current practice in China through the interviews. 
 
4.3 Understanding the status quo of SME financing in Zhejiang Province—A 
comprehensive perspective 
In this section, we adopt a comprehensive perspective to analyze the SME financing 
in Zhejiang Province. In the previous two chapters, we have applied questionnaire 
survey approach to study Zhejiang’s SMEs and their financing situation. Through the 
efforts made, we could learn the demand side of the funding. From the empirical 
results conducted, we find that firms with strong political ties, higher education of 
managers, larger turnover and having received credit rating are more likely to employ 
formal financing practices. Moreover, we find that more factors work in the case of 
the Global Financial Crisis while only political ties and credit rating status work in the 
tightened monetary background like the period after 2010. Combining these results, 
we could conclude that reputation and relationship is vital in obtaining funding from 
formal financing channels in China. Furthermore, the practice of informal financing is 
found to be universal and widespread.  
 
In order to propose specific and insightful advice, it is also necessary for us to learn 
the supply side of the funding, i.e., to find out how the formal and informal financial 
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institutions regard financing the SMEs. There are mainly two types of fund providers 
to SMEs: namely, the formal and informal financial institutions. The former type 
mainly refers to the commercial banks while the latter includes pawns shops, warranty 
companies, micro-loan companies, etc. Both types of institutions play an active role in 
SME lending in Zhejiang, a province characterized by developed informal finance. 
 
Here, we try to lean the SMEs financing from supply side through interviews. We 
invited five managers from different departments of one commercial bank (the 
departments belong to the bank’s headquarters) to attend. Specifically, the managers 
from the corporate banking department, SME business management and operation 
center, and asset liability management department can offer deep insight into the 
commercial bank’s daily operation and management practice in SME lending. The 
manager from the investment-banking department can inform us on the situation of 
SME products in the capital market. The practice of the informal financial institutions 
can be learnt from the manager of the financial institution department. The interview 
sample covers the different angles needed to understand the practice of the two types 
of financing institutions we discussed earlier. 
 
Specific questions were asked about how managers treat SME financing strategically, 
how they put the strategy into practice, what difficulties they face in real business, and 
what advice they propose to solve the difficulties. Due to the concern that it is hard to 
define an accurate boundary of formal/informal finance, as well as the fact that banks’ 
SME lending business is intertwined with those informal financing institutions, we 
tried to obtain the information from these bank managers. Questions have been asked 
about their opinion toward the role of informal financial institutions in SME financing, 
how they can meet the need of SME financing, and what the potential problems of 
informal financing are. The specific questions are presented in Appendix 2. 
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Through the interview, we learn the basic logic of banks’ SME lending. It could be 
explained from the following three aspects: 
 
1) The incentives for banks to lend to SMEs 
It was once thought that Chinese banks mainly lent to SOEs and neglected the SME 
business. Through the introduction of the managers from both the SME business 
management and operation center and the asset liability management department, we 
find that significant changes have happened in recent years driven by the rapid pace of 
interest rate liberalization. On one hand, more and more SOEs have tapped into the 
capital markets to get funding. The comprehensive funding cost of issuing corporate 
bonds is 85–90% of the corresponding benchmark loan rate of the banks. The funding 
efficiency (the filing process, waiting period to obtain the funds, the opportunity of 
choosing the timing of issue, etc.) of issuing bonds is also higher. On the other hand, 
banks can barely profit from SOE lending. SOEs not only require a low funding cost, 
but also require that the funds that they put into the banks account should be deposited 
with the highest rate available (10% above the corresponding benchmark rate, the 
ceiling of the official deposit rate in China). The bank now has stringent requirements 
for SOE lending: unless the comprehensive return can reach a specified target, the 
branches are forbidden to lend to SOEs. 
 
In contrast, banks lay more emphasis on SME lending. This can be shown from the 
following dimensions. Firstly, banks have to be more engaged in SME business in 
order to fulfill their profit since the once-lucrative SOE business can no longer bring 
benefits. Secondly, more favorable policies have been put forward at the national level, 
such as granting more credit quota to commercial banks if their SME lending growth 
rate can surpass the overall lending growth rate, tolerance for higher non-performing 
loan rate, and permission for banks to issue SME-specific bonds to lend to SMEs. 
Moreover, SMEs can bring a satisfactory comprehensive return for the banks. The rate 
banks charge to SMEs is 10–30% higher than the corresponding loan benchmark rate. 
Furthermore, banks have built internal incentives to lend to SMEs, such as 
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independent SME centers have been set up, and the branches can get more 
compensation from fulfilling the given target (including the loan growth, daily 
average deposit target, non-performing loan target, etc.). 
 
To sum up, banks now put more strategic emphasis on lending to SMEs. 
 
2) The constraints banks face to lend to SMEs 
The banking industry is heavily regulated in China. Commercial banks face three 
statutory and regulatory constraints in lending as laid down by managers from the 
assets liability management department. 
 Statutory loan/deposit ratio 
It is written in commercial banking law that the loan/deposit ratio must not surpass 
75%. The deposit level directly limits the loan growth. 
 Regulated capital adequacy ratio 
There is a two-level capital adequacy ratio: the capital adequacy ratio and the core 
capital adequacy ratio. Such a ratio directly constrains the growth of risk-weighted 
assets with a loan covering a large part. 
 Given quarterly loan quota 
The quarterly loan quota available to banks is given directly from the Peoples’ Bank 
of China, the central bank, according to a set of indicators including: the banks’ 
performance in SME lending, the management of loan growth, the situation of the 
loan/deposit ratio and the capital adequacy ratio, and liquidity management. Severe 
punishments are handed out if banks choose to lend more than the given quota. 
 
These three constraints directly constrain the upper limit of loans available. Apart 
from that, banks still face internal constraints in SME lending. 
 
 Untimely response 
The SME financing need is fast, urgent, and frequent. The loan period is scarcely 
longer than one year. SMEs hope that they can use the funding when needed. In 
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practice, however, the banks usually take more than two weeks to decide whether the 
loan can be granted. Most of the time is wasted on specifying the collaterals due to the 
fact that the collaterals SME provides are usually in niche markets and hard to 
evaluate. Furthermore, the loan product provided is not flexible enough. 
 
 Inaccurate pricing mechanism 
One of the potential hazards of SME lending is a higher non-performing loan rate. 
The common practice is that SMEs have to provide credible collaterals to ensure that 
the loan lent remains safe even if SME could not fulfill the obligation on its own, and 
hence, the riskiness of the loan can be lowered. As for how much the banks can 
charge for each loan, it mainly relies on subjective judgment. In other words, banks 
can set a given profit margin target; however, banks cannot calculate different types of 
cost accurately, especially the operation cost. Such pricing inaccuracy leads to more 
requirements and more reliance on collateral. More dangerously, it may lead to 
insufficient compensation for potential risk. 
 
 Unsatisfactory human resources and IT resources 
SME lending is human extensive, the size of each loan is rather small but involves 
multiple loans. Currently, banks rely on branches but the geographical distribution of 
branches cannot effectively cover the SME businesses. Meanwhile, the number of 
people that can be devoted to SMEs is quite limited in banks. Usually, banks’ SME 
client managers are also in charge of larger businesses. Therefore, they may not pay 
too much attention to SME clients. Moreover, the development of tailor-made system 
cannot catch up with the development of SMEs lending business. 
 
To sum up, although banks have strategically paid attention to SME lending, there are 
still many tactical problems to be solved. 
 
3) The role of capital market products in SME lending 
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In recent years, the bond markets have enjoyed rapid growth in China. Diversified 
products have been developed, including bonds issued for SME financing. However, 
according to the description of the bank’s investment banking manager, these products 
were created merely for innovation. After the “boom” in early stage, investors’ 
passion soon evaporated. The benefit the undertakers could obtain is negligible 
compared with other bonds and most of the investors hope to find firms that will one 
day be listed on the stock market. With the door of initial public offering (IPO) 
constantly being shut, the investors' patience withers. It seems that institutional 
investors would not take a more active role in SME bond products unless a stock 
option is already present, and only then could the tradeoff between risk and return be 
achieved. 
 
Through the interview, we also determined the role of informal financial institutions 
in SME lending, which are revealed by the following two aspects: 
 
1) Informal financial institutions in SME lending 
These informal institutions take an active role in SME lending. Compared with banks, 
they can better meet the “fast, urgent, and frequent” need of SME financing. They 
have fewer requirements in terms of collateral and are more reliant on relationships 
and soft information as we observed in the empirical results. The process is more 
flexible and risk management is mainly reflected in the much higher rate that informal 
institutions charge. Although they may require collateral, less time or even no time 
has to be spent on evaluation. 
 
2) Regulation of informal financial institutions 
Unlike banks, the informal financial institutions face fewer direct regulations. The last 
two decades have witnessed several rounds of boom and bust in these informal 
financial institutions, and thus, their development is characterized by high cyclicality. 
It seems necessary that a counter-cyclicality mechanism should be set up. 
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4.4 Policy suggestions 
In this section, we try to propose eight policy suggestions through a combination of 
the literature consulted with the empirical results and the contents of the interviewss. 
 
The policy suggestions are developed from three dimensions: the fund providers for 
SMEs, the SMEs, and the background of SME lending. For the fund providers, we 
mainly focus on the formal financing institutions since micro-policy suggestions 
could be proposed accordingly, while macro-policy suggestions should be proposed to 
cope with informal financing since we found that that nearly all kinds of SME 
entrepreneurs can obtain informal financing. 
 
4.4.1 Policies suggestions for SME fund providers 
Through the interviews, we know that commercial banks nowadays have strategic 
incentives to do business with SMEs, and symbolic measures have been taken, such 
as setting up independent SME centers. Internal incentives have also been built. 
However, we know from the questionnaire that more than half of the respondents still 
could not get funding from the banks. Just as one of the bank managers said, service 
efficiency should be further enhanced. Accordingly, we put forward four policy 
proposals. Moreover, the development of rural banks should also be paid due 
attention. 
 
4.4.1.1 Setting up community banks to serve SMEs 
From the questionnaire investigation, we learn that relationships count more in SME 
lending. However, such relationships cannot easily be built. In order to relieve the 
information asymmetry, banks require more collateral, as we observed from the 
interview. As Kooli (2011) claims, community banks should be set up to serve SMEs. 
Due to the shortened distance between the banks and the firms/entrepreneurs, banks 
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could have better access to their dynamics. To some extent, they could learn more 
about firms through frequent observation rather than reading infrequent financial 
statements. The banks, therefore, could discover the SMEs with potential and evaluate 
their properties in advance so that the period of loan granting could be shortened. 
 
Community banks are known for their focus on traditional banking activities, and they 
mainly conduct lending- and deposit-gathering activities within a fairly limited market 
area (Adler, 2012). Community banks provide a range of products and services to 
meet the needs of local consumers and SMEs, including electronic banking services, 
free ATM services, credit cards, debit cards, billing, savings and investment products, 
mortgages, consumer loans, small and micro business loans, and agricultural loans. 
They are said to be relationship lenders, which rely to a significant degree on 
specialized knowledge gained through long-term business relationships. 
 
Community banks of this pattern are an independent legal entity, similar to China's 
rural credit cooperatives and other financial institutions. At the beginning of the 
interest rates' marketization in the US during an environment of higher interest rates, 
development of a monetary fund and the direct financing market, as well as financial 
product innovation, all oppressed the development space of the traditional community 
banks. Lots of community banks went bankrupt and were acquired by other financial 
institutions. 
 
ING Direct, known as the model of internet banking (Fei and Dou, 2013), is the direct 
bank under the ING Group. Their ideology is to make things simple. First, customers 
and products are simple. The targeted customers are 30- to 50-year-old educated 
people. The products are also simple since their line of the products is strictly limited 
to savings deposit accounts, real-estate mortgages, and money-market funds. Secondly, 
they aim to control the cost and to benefit customers. The benefit of lower costs in 
direct banking operations will be returned to the products’ revenues. Moreover, they 
make an effort to enhance the customers’ experience. The offline site is mainly in the 
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form of coffee bars. There is no counter or cash business. After accumulating 
customers’ resources, they try to transform the community bank into a universal bank. 
 
Xin and Zhang (2012) noted that Wells Fargo Community Bank focuses on providing 
financial products and services (including financing, savings, and intermediate 
business) to small-business owners whose sales are less than US$10 million a year. 
The physical outlets of Wells Fargo Community Bank are mainly distributed in dense 
residential communities with an open layout, a separate business area, and rest areas. 
The interior decoration is simple and warm. 
 
In addition to investment in the physical network, Wells Fargo also invest a lot in their 
information system and staff training to have a better understanding of customer 
needs. With long-term accumulation, a breakthrough has been made in cross-selling. 
Wells Fargo's experience can be summarized into the following two aspects: 
 
1) They increase physical outlets to guide the adjustment of asset structure. Wells 
Fargo has made much more investment in physical network construction and 
human resources than other banks. The purpose is to tap customer resources, 
improve relationship business, enhance customer experience, and lay solid 
foundation in cross selling. As a result, the physical outlets of Wells Fargo's 
Community Bank have played a decisive role in its retail business, especially in 
the housing loan and retail loan market. 
 
2) The physical outlets are arranged with strategic consideration. The main 
considerations of Wells Fargo in establishing physical outlets include four aspects: 
density, cross-selling, efficiency, investment quantity and quality. Specifically, 
density measures how many local residents a single physical outlet can cover; 
cross-selling measures the number of products and services a single household or 
family will buy and, accordingly, how much income it could earn; efficiency 
mainly refers to the operation cost, including transaction costs, marketing costs, 
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rental cost, etc. The area and cost of Wells Fargo Community Bank have been 
declining in the long run. Investment quantity and quality refers to learning how to 
optimize network construction to improve the customer experience and to increase 
the number of customers and cross-selling. Wells Fargo Bank has established a 
quantitative evaluation system to cover the four aspects mentioned above. 
 
As the experience of Wells Fargo shows, as introduced by Xin and Zhang (2012), 
community banks in Zhejiang should focus on their loan business since it could bring 
long-term benefit although it maybe not be attractive in the short term. Through mass, 
intensive, and standardized management, especially in risk management, loan 
products could produce a stable profit. On one hand, with the credit risk controlled, 
credit spread is generally higher than that of deposit products; on the other hand, loan 
products are more powerful in strengthening customer relationships than deposit 
products. They could bring more cross-selling opportunities and bring more benefits. 
 
In practice, the community banks could be in two styles: set up within a neighborhood 
or a shopping mall (or Science and Techonology Park). The community banks located 
in neighborhoods are usually smaller in size than those located in shop malls. 
Community banks of both types could provide financing services. Those located in 
neighborhoods could provide loan products to inhabitants or merchants while those 
located in shopping malls could provide loan products to firms within it. 
 
4.4.1.2 Simplifying the SME financing procedure 
Simplification could be achieved through a more flexible way of paying back loans 
and more accurate loan pricing. From the interviews, we learned that the informal 
financial institutions offer a more flexible style of financing. The banks could learn a 
lesson from that. They could design the products as follows: specify a maximum term; 
the interest is computed daily with the rate increasing as the term increases; specify a 
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comprehensive amount so that SMEs could use the funding when necessary as long as 
the ceiling is not surpassed. 
 
Mybank, an internet bank that was set up in Zhejiang Province in 2015, provide 
tailor-made financing products to SMEs. The key feature of Mybank is that it grants 
credit loans based on big-data technology to conduct a credit rating rather than setting 
up rigid requirements for collateral. Till the end of February 2016, Mybank has served 
800 thousand SMEs and provided loans worth 45 billion Yuan. Nowadays, the 
mindset of banks is that the risk control for SME loans is achieved by requiring more 
collateral. This mindset should be transformed so that SME loans are controlled 
through accurate pricing while collateral is merely a supplement. 
 
Banks should make full use of the data they have accumulated for years on SME 
clients. With abundant data and powerful data-mining skills, it is probable that they 
could compute the cost accurately and then add the risk premium to the benchmark 
accordingly. In addition, risk specialists should be allocated to the community bank 
branches to learn the SMEs' situation in a timely manner. Such pricing could help 
cover the risk and shorten the loan-granting period. 
 
4.4.1.3 Committing more IT resources and optimizing the structure of human 
resources to enhance the efficiency of the loan process 
In order to achieve the desired results of the policies mentioned above, banks should 
commit more resources to their IT system. It is necessary to make a capital investment 
in IT systems, especially in big-data technology. Big-data technology could help 
banks to dig, analyze, and use the huge amounts of data banks have accumulated for 
years. Specifically, banks could apply the big-data technology to identify customers 
with market potential and to provide a credit rating to customers. The banks could, 
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therefore, grant the loans to the customers that they fully understand and risk 
premiums could be computed more accurately. 
 
Meanwhile, the commercial banks should optimize the structure of their human 
resources. One of the critical elements that result in the low efficiency of commercial 
banks' response to clients' demands is that it has too many redundant staff, especially 
in the operation line. Although the rigid operation procedure could to some extent 
ensure safety, it could hardly match the rapid changes in clients' requirements in 
financing. Hence, it will be necessary to cut staff from operation lines. Operation 
teams should be lean and its staff should be able to master big-data technology rather 
than merely implement the procedure repeatedly. 
 
Despite the fact that the number of client managers is large, the number of qualified 
SME-oriented client managers is still insufficient. As we learned from the interviews, 
many of the “SME client managers” were originally corporate client managers. Some 
of them have no expertise in SMEs and they merely apply the same practice that they 
would use with large firms. Hence, a team of qualified SME client managers should 
be cultivated. 
 
Robust business and management IT systems should be accessed by different levels of 
staff. The power of big-data technology can only be brought completely into play 
when it can be grasped and applied sufficiently by various levels of staff. Frequent 
training is also necessary to equip the staff with cutting-edge skills. 
 
4.4.1.4 Cultivating a group of dynamic rural banks 
Rural banks refer to the banking institutions that provide financial services in rural 
areas for local farmers, agriculture, and rural economic development. Such banks are 
usually a subsidiary of larger commercial banks. As Zhang (2016) stated, rural banks 
are the most effective and promising among small financial institutions. The 
development of rural cooperatives has been quite slow and does not have a promising 
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future. Microfinance companies and peer-to-peer platforms, although enjoying rapid 
growth, face severe pressure in bad loans. Till the end of May 2015, the 
non-performing loan ratio of microfinance companies amounted to an astonishingly 
high level of 12%. In the first half of 2015, about 419 peer-to-peer platforms have 
confronted difficulties in China. Mybank, despite its competitiveness, mainly focuses 
on online clients. It is quite unlikely that it could completely replace these offline 
banks. Therefore, due emphasis should be laid on the development of rural banks. 
 
During the first half of 2015, about 71 rural banks opened in Zhejiang Province 
(Zhang, 2016). Pertinent measures should be taken for these banks of different quality. 
For those banks performing badly, a sponsoring bank should enhance management or 
reorganize the institution if necessary. For those banks with biased market positioning, 
measures should be taken in structural adjustment. Meanwhile, rural banks should be 
set up voluntarily rather than as a political task. Opportunities to set up rural banks 
should also be given to those private entrepreneurs who are eager to serve the SMEs 
and share their understanding of SME financing. 
 
4.4.2 Policy suggestions for SMEs 
In this part, we put forward three proposals for SMEs to improve their business so that 
they could be in a better position to obtain funds. 
 
4.4.2.1 Building their reputation and being engaged in credit rating 
As we found in Chapter 2, reputation and having received a credit rating help when 
SMEs try to obtain funds from formal financing institutions. Therefore, SMEs should 
try to build their reputation. A recommended practice is to take an active role in local 
social activities and to let more local people get to know the firm. Making a 
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contribution to the local community naturally attracts the attention of banks and other 
institutions. 
 
Meanwhile, as more and more credit-rating firms grow in China, SMEs should try to 
be engaged in credit rating. Conducting credit rating is beneficial for SMEs in many 
ways. Credit rating sends diagnostic signals to the firms as to which parts have been 
done well and which parts need to be further improved. Furthermore, such a move 
gives formal financial institutions confidence in the firm’s operation and gives them a 
better way to judge the firm and to price the loan more accurately. 
 
4.4.2.2 Enhancing corporate governance 
As Ramakrishnan (2013) and Mahzan and Yan (2013) argue, it is imperative for 
SMEs to strengthen their governance. Sound corporate governance is helpful in 
building mutual trust with formal institutions, especially banks. 
 
For SMEs, the first step to take is to set a standardized corporate charter, and next, 
sound internal control systems and incentive schemes for senior managers should be 
set up. A firm’s transparency could be enhanced through periodical disclosure to the 
stakeholders. 
 
Frequent communication with financial institutions like banks is helpful. For 
financially health SMEs, they fear any unexpected sudden withdrawal of their credit 
line from commercial banks. For example, banks may have orally promised that the 
matured loan will be rolled over, but monetary tightening or risk aversion over 
non-performing loans may lead them to call in the loans. In this case, communication 
with banks before the maturity date could alleviate the situation to some extent. With 
the reluctance of banks to roll over the loan noticed beforehand, they could take other 
measures. 
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4.4.2.3 Being more engaged with banks, rather than merely building 
relationships 
In Zhejiang Province, banks tend to behave in a pro-cycle pattern. Specifically, banks 
tend to over-lend when the economy is overheating and they tend to be too risk-averse 
when the economy takes a downturn. Such behavior is quite disadvantageous for 
firms, especially SMEs. Being further engaged with banks, rather than building 
temporal relationships, could help SMEs weather economic cyclicality. 
 
With more community banks set up, SMEs should use the opportunity to show banks 
their strength and advantages. Through such engagement, both sides could learn more 
about each other, and mutual confidence could then be increased. 
 
When the local economy goes well, commercial banks could learn through contact 
with SMEs whether firms or a niche industry may enjoy further growth. If so, 
procedures like collateral evaluation could be fulfilled beforehand; more convenient 
and flexible lending covenants could be arranged. If not, risk specialists should give 
clear signals that over-lending may lead to a surge in non-performing loans in the 
future. 
 
When the local economy is going badly, the banks could, through close interaction, 
better detect unfavorable developments in the firm or within the industry, and then 
procedures like risk mitigation should be adopted. For those SMEs trapped in 
temporal difficulties, they could communicate with banks frankly about their situation 
and work out feasible solutions to weather the difficulties. Thus, both sides could 
benefit from closer cooperation. 
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4.4.3 Policy suggestions for improving the background of SME lending 
From the empirical findings, we know that nearly all kinds of SMEs may tap into the 
informal financing market. Meanwhile, as we have discovered from the interviews, 
the behavior of informal financial institutions is quite cyclical. In other words, their 
function is severely disrupted when crises hit. Therefore, macro-policies should guide 
the informal market to develop properly and healthily, regardless of the business cycle. 
Here, we propose to set up a rainy day fund as a counter-cyclicality mechanism. 
 
The rainy day fund should be set up mainly locally (at the county level). The SMEs 
within the county could participate in the fund willingly as registered partners; a third 
party (ideally, a bank or a group of banks) could participate in the fund as special 
registered partners as they could commit some funds or merely manage the funds on 
the SMEs’ behalf. Registered SMEs should provide basic information so that a 
monitoring and supervising mechanism could be built accordingly. Meanwhile, 
registered SMEs could put funds into the rainy fund when their business runs well and 
they have excess capital. Such an arrangement could, to some extent, alleviate the 
concern of moral hazard. During tranquil times when the funding market works 
properly, the reserve fund could do nothing but accumulate money as the funds 
collected could be invested into liquid assets such as treasury bills. However, when a 
crisis hits, such funds could be lent out to the registered partners. The capital could be 
offered at the market rate plus appropriate margins. With the rainy fund in place, the 
volatility of the informal financing market could be lowered. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we firstly consult the extant literature to learn the SMEs' practice 
around the world, and then we interviewed five managers from a commercial bank to 
learn the formal and informal financial institutions’ mindset regarding SMEs. The 
focus is on commercial banks: their strategic incentives, as well as regulative and 
tactical constraints, are discussed. We find that capital market could offer little to 
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SME financing under the current circumstances. Moreover, it has been found that 
informal institutions’ behavior is quite cyclical. 
 
Through the combination of what we find from the literature, interviews, and the 
empirical results from the previous two chapters, we propose specific policy 
suggestions, and eight recommendations are developed from three dimensions: the 
fund providers for SMEs, the SMEs, and the background that underpins them. For 
fund providers (mainly banks), we advise setting up community banks to serve SMEs, 
simplifying the SME financing procedure, committing more human and IT resources  
and cultivating a group of dynamic rural banks to enhance the efficiency of the loan 
process. For SMEs, we advise that they should build their reputation, try to be 
engaged in credit rating, should enhance corporate governance, and should be more 
engaged with banks. Last but not least, we propose setting up a rainy day fund as a 
counter-cyclicality mechanism. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This thesis mainly focuses on studying the SME financing in Zhejiang Province and 
exploring the how informal lending could play a greater role. In Chapter 2, after 
consulting the literature, we designed a tailor-made questionnaire to determine the 
basic information, business establishment, business growth, and funding sources of 
the firms. With the data collected from 150 valid copies, we could gain an 
understanding of these firms and its financing situation through basic descriptive 
statistics. 
 
Subsequently in Chapter 3, we gain further insight into SME financing in Zhejiang. 
From the empirical results conducted, we find that firms with strong political ties, 
higher education, larger turnover, and having received a credit rating are more likely 
to employ formal financing practices. No consistent results were found for informal 
financing practices. Moreover, we find that more factors worked during the Global 
Financial Crisis while only political ties and credit-rating status worked during the 
tightened monetary background of the period after 2010. Combining these results, we 
conclude that reputation and relationships are vital in helping SMEs to obtain funds 
from formal financing channels in China, whilst basically all SMEs are able to obtain 
informal finance. This finding is critical: on the one hand, the criteria necessary to 
obtain formal finance seem to be quite stringent, while on the other hand, almost any 
SME can obtain informal finance. In these circumstances, informal financing will 
inevitably play a dominant role in the financial system. These empirical findings call 
for specific policy suggestions. 
 
In Chapter 4, we consult the extant literature to determine the global SME practice, 
and then interview five managers from a commercial bank to learn the formal and 
informal financial institutions’ mindset towards SMEs. The focus is mainly on 
commercial banks: their strategic incentives, as well as regulative and tactical 
constraints, are fully discussed. Meanwhile, we find that capital markets could offer 
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little to SME financing under the current circumstances. Moreover, it has been found 
that informal institutions’ behavior is quite cyclical. Combining what we find from the 
literature, interviews, and the empirical results, we propose specific policy 
suggestions. Eight proposals are developed from three dimensions: the fund providers 
for SMEs, the SMEs, and the background that underpins them. For fund providers 
(mainly banks), we advise four measures: setting up community banks to serve SMEs, 
simplifying the SME financing procedure, committing more human and IT resources 
and cultivating a group of dynamic rural banks to enhance the efficiency of the loan 
process. For SMEs, we advise that they should build their reputation, try to be 
engaged in credit rating, should enhance corporate governance, and should be more 
engaged with banks. Last but not least, we propose to set up a rainy day fund as a 
counter-cyclicality mechanism, detailed arrangement is also introduced. 
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Appendix 2 Interview questions list 
We invited five managers in the headquarters of commercial bank A, which is a 
mid-sized bank with their headquarters in Zhejiang. The five managers were from 
different departments, including corporate banking department (in charge of the daily 
management of corporate banking business), SME business management and 
operation center (in charge of the daily management of SME business), 
investment-banking department (in charge of the investment-banking business, 
including undertaking SME bonds), financial institution department (in charge of the 
management of the financial institutions' relationships), asset liability management 
department (in charge of the resource alignment and the performance appraisal 
management of the whole bank). Specific questions were asked accordingly: 
 
SME lending strategy 
What is your bank’s strategy toward SME financing? 
 
What measures have your bank been taking in boosting SME businesses? 
 
What are the constraints your bank face in lending to firms and SMEs? 
 
SME lending practice 
How could your bank put the strategy into practice? 
 
What products could you provide to SMEs apart from loans? 
 
Could these capital market products help alleviate SMEs’ financing? 
 
How soon could your bank meet SMEs' financing needs? 
 
What difficulties do you face in real business? 
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What solutions could you offer? 
 
Informal financial institutions in SME lending 
Do you have a business relationship with informal financial institutions? 
 
What’s your opinion of informal financial institutions’ role in SME lending? 
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